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ARTICLE
Whose Federalism?-The Burger
Court's Treatment of State Civil
Liberties Judgments
By ROBERT C. WELSH*

Introduction
An enduring theme of the Burger Court's approach to civil liber-

ties has been insulating state judicial and political processes from what
a majority of the Justices regard as unwarranted intermeddling by federal courts. In marked contrast to the centralizing tendencies of the

civil liberties revolution inaugurated by the Warren Court, the current
majority has limited the ability of state civil liberties claimants to gain
access to federal tribunals for the vindication of their constitutional
rights. Under the banner of "Our Federalism,"' federal courts have

been barred from interfering with pending state criminal2 and civil3
proceedings; door closing techniques such as the requirement of exhausting available state remedies have been strictly applied;4 and the
availability of habeas corpus review has been significantly curtailed.'
Ironically, at the same time that the Burger Court has invoked the
tenets of federalism and state autonomy to close federal courthouse

doors to state civil liberties claimants, it has flung those doors wide
* Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of California, Los
Angeles. B.A., 1969, M.A., 1973, Ph.D., 1979, University of California, Santa Barbara. The
author is indebted to Howard Gillman and especially George Robertie for their unflagging
research assistance; to Ronald K.L. Collins for his thoughtful comments on an earlier draft;
and to the Academic Senate Committee on Research, UCLA, for financial assistance.
1. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
2. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 592 (1975); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
3. See Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592
(1975).
4. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1 (1981);
Braden v. Thirtieth Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
5. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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open for prosecutors and other state officials complaining that state
courts have adopted overly expansive interpretations of Bill of Rights
guarantees. Given the tensions between the Supreme Court and state
courts during the Warren era,6 one might have assumed that the willingness of many state courts to actively protect individual rights would
finally end the twenty year struggle over the course of civil liberties
decisionmaking. Yet the struggle continues. Only the sides have
changed. Instead of reversing state judgments because they fall below
minimum federal requirements, the Court now regularly upsets state
court decisions because too much protection has been afforded individuals in the name of the Bill of Rights. For the first time in modem civil
liberties history, the Bill of Rights is being used by the Supreme Court
to police the "outer limits" of state court civil liberties decisionmaking.
The increasing frequency with which expansive state civil liberties
judgments are being subject to review and reversal belies the Burger
Court's oft-repeated allegiance to a principled conception of federalism
and decentralized decisionmaking. The values of decentralization,
state experimentation, and local autonomy are also jeopardized when
state court decisions extending more than the absolute "minimum"are
overturned. This is especially true during a period when state courts
are beginning to develop a separate body of rules and principles protecting individual rights under their state constitutions.
The renewed interest in state constitutional law represents a sharp
departure from the recent past.8 State bills of rights were one of the
6. See 1958 REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF STATE CHIEF JUSTICES, which declared
that "the Supreme Court too often has tended to adopt the role of policy maker without
proper judicial restraint." Quoted in W. MURPHY & C. PRITCHETT, COURTS, JUDGES AND
POLITICS 619 (1961).
7. The use of the term "minimum" may be somewhat confusing. Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights establish the constitutional minimum in the sense that
state courts, although forbidden from affording less than the Court has decreed, are free to
provide greater protection under the state constitution. This is different from saying that
Supreme Court standards are "minimums" in the sense that they afford no more than "those
minimal historic safeguards for securing trial by reason... and below which we reach what
is really trial by force." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943). Justice Frankfurter's McNabb opinion is a vivid reminder that as recently as four decades ago, the Court
thought about federal "minimums" in the latter sense of the term. "Minimums" is used in
this Article in the first sense.
8. The literature on state constitutional law has grown dramatically during the past
decade. For a collection of recent articles on the subject, see Abrahamson, Reincarnationof
State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 957, 972-74 (1982); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the

States' Bill of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379,396 n.70 (1980); Developmentsin the Law-The
Interpretationof State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1324, 1328 n.20 (1982); and
the column on state constitutional law by Ronald K.L. Collins which is a regular feature of
the NationalLaw Journal.
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major casualties of the incorporation of the Bill of Rights. "The federalization of all our rights," remarked Vermont Supreme Court Justice
Charles Douglas, "has led to a rapid withering of the development of
state decisions based upon state constitutional provisions." 9 One can
hardly expect state judges, who for the past two decades have thought
about civil liberties almost exclusively in terms of Supreme Court interpretations of the Bill of Rights, to forsake overnight the immense body
of federal precedent and begin deciding cases solely on the basis of
their own long neglected state constitutional guarantees. Given the
rather underdeveloped condition of state civil liberties law, it is understandable that state judges-despite the formal independence they enjoy under the adequate state ground doctrine' 0 -continue to look to the
Bill of Rights for inspiration and guidance.
Whether state courts are truly capable of assuming the role of
"frontier agent[s] of American reform""I remains to be seen. But one
thing appears certain: independent state civil liberties decisionmaking
in the post-incorporation era must, of necessity, be innovative decisionmaking,' 2 and the only way innovation will take place is if state courts
are permitted to expand individual rights free from the constraining
oversight of federal judicial review. The reticence of many state judges
to question restrictive Supreme Court civil liberties rulings' 3 means
that the impact of federal review and reversal will often be to thwart
the process of independent state constitutional decisionmaking. Even
when state judges do not feel constrained as a matter of judicial propriety from openly departing from operative Supreme Court rulings, they
may find themselves constrained politically. Innovative state courts,
such as the California Supreme Court,' 4 are already under political attack by conservative groups that oppose the expansion of rights for various groups.' 5 State courts generally do not enjoy the same degree of
9. Douglas, State JudicialActivisim-The New Rolefor State Bills of Rights, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1123, 1140 (1978).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 64-88.
11. Wilkinson, Justice John M Harlan and the Values of Federalism, 57 VA. L. REv.
1185, 1199 (1971).
12. For a discussion of the impact of incorporation on Supreme Court/state court relations, see infra text accompanying notes 210-41.
13. See, e.g., People v. Norman, 112 Cal. Rptr. 43,48-49 (1974), vacated, 14 Cal. 3d 929,
538 P.2d 237, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109 (1975); People v. Level, 117 Cal. App. 3d 462, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 904 (1981); State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255 (Mont. 1983).
14. For a recent assessment of the California Supreme Court, see P. STOLZ, JUDGING
JUDGES (1981), and infra notes 146-48.
15. For a discussion of the political attack launched by conservatives against the California Supreme Court, see Ellis, Judges and Politics: Accountability and Independence in an
Election Year, 12 N.M.L. REv. 873 (1982); Kleps, Can Our Supreme Court Survive?, L.A.
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institutional independence as their federal counterparts, 16 and hence
are particularly vulnerable to such attacks.' 7 Wittingly or unwittingly,"8 the Burger Court's policy of reversing expansive state judgments plays into the hands of those who would impose greater political
control on state judges. Given popular perceptions that one's rights
begin and end with the latest Supreme Court pronouncement, a state
court decision expanding rights--especially in the face of a High Court
reversal on the subject-may appear to be an irresponsible "gesture of
defiance."' 19
In an effort to understand the Burger Court's treatment of state
civil liberties judgments, this Article examines all paid civil liberties
appeals coming directly from state courts in which one of the parties
was a state official and the other an individual rights claimant.2" The
study spans thirteen terms of the Burger Court (i.e., the 1970-1982
terms). Each appeal has been classified according to the party seeking
review, civil liberties claimant or state official, as well as the civil liberties issue involved. Knowing which party initiated the appeal indicates
whether the state court decision below adopted an expansive or narrow
interpretation of the civil liberties claim involved. The Court's handling of these appeals has also been classified by whether review was
granted or denied, or whether the state court judgment was summarily
reversed or vacated for further proceedings. Finally, the disposition of
the handful of cases in which the Justices granted full review was recorded in terms of whether the state court judgment was affirmed or
Daily J., Aug. 18, 1982, at 4,'col. 3; Kleps, Court Baiting, L.A. Daily J., Apr. 7, 1981, at 4, col.
3; Mosk, The Supreme Court: The Sky Is Not Falling: "Only A Few Clouds," L.A. Daily J.,
Apr. 7, 1981, at 4, col. 3.
16. See Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1977). See generally
Solimine & Walker, ConstitutionalLitigation in FederalandState Courls: An EmpiricalAnalysis of JudicialParity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213 (1983).
17. See B. MEDSGER, FRAMED: THE NEW RIGHT ATTACK ON CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE

BIRD AND THE COURTS (1983); Davis, The Bench Cannot be Bullied, 10 BARRISTER 26 (1983)
(interview with Chief Justice Rose Bird of the California Supreme Court); Oazell, Chief
Justice Rose Bird- The Second Scene of a Two Act Play?, 12 LINCOLN L. REv. 77 (1981)
(discussion of attempts by conservatives to recall Chief Justice Bird).
18. It has, in part, been both, although the evidence increasingly points to the latter
interpretation. See Montana v. Jackson, 460 U.S. 1030 (1983); Michigan v. Long, 103 S.
3469 (1983) and infra text accompanying notes 118-79. See also Florida v. Casal, 459 U.S.
821 (1982), cert. dismissed, 462 U.S. 637 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
19. See Deukmejian & Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor-JudicialReview Under the

CaliforniaConstitution, 6

HASTINGS CONST.

L.Q. 975 (1980).

20. Excluded from this study are state civil liberties judgments involving two private
parties and all informapauperispetitions.
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reversed. 21
This Article is divided into three sections. Section I examines the
Burger Court's overall record of reviewing state civil liberties judgments. Of particular interest is comparison of the relative success rate
experienced by each side in obtaining some kind of favorable action by
the Court.2 2
Section II focuses on one small but significant subset of state civil
liberties petitions, namely, those petitions filed by state officials in
which there is some uncertainty whether the state judgment rested on
state law-and hence was insulated from review under the adequate
state ground doctrine--or grounded entirely in federal law and thus
subject to review.23
In the final section, the Court's treatment of state civil liberties
cases is assessed from the perspective of federalism. How can the
Court square its allegiance to federalism with its one sided review of
state civil liberties judgments? Just whose federalism is being served?

I. The Style and Substance of the Court's Review of
Expansive State Court Decisions
The 1970 Term proved to be a benchmark in the struggle between
state courts and the Supreme Court over the direction of civil liberties
decisionmaking. For the first time in a criminal case, the Supreme
Court reversed a state court decision because it had adopted an excessively expansive interpretation of Bill of Rights protections.24 In California v. Green,25 the Court ruled that the California Supreme Court
had erred in reading the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause to
prohibit the prosecution's introduction of a witness' prior inconsistent
statement into evidence against the defendant. Despite the novelty of
the Court's action, neither the majority nor the dissent questioned the
propriety of reversing expansive state court judgments. The Justices
apparently saw their decision as simply disabusing state judges of the
21. In cases in which the state court judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part,
it was determined whether or not the primary civil liberties claim was affirmed or reversed,
and the case was classified accordingly.
22. By "favorable action" it is meant that the Court did one of three things: it vacated
the judgment, reversed, or granted full review. This does not mean, however, that the party
receiving this favorable action necessarily won on the merits.
23. For a discussion of the adequate state ground doctrine, see infra text accompanying
notes 64-88.
24. See Wilkes, The New Federalismin CriminalProcedure: State Court Evasion of the
Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421, 432-33 (1974).
25. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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view that the Sixth Amendment "impelled" 2 6 the exclusion of this testimony from trial. For example, Justice Harlan, writing separately, characterized the state high court's decision as "an understandable
misconception, as I see things, of numerous decisions of this Court...
that have indiscriminately equated 'confrontation' with 'crossexamination.' "27
When viewed in the context of the Warren Court era, the Green
decision signaled a significant shift in perspective-perhaps even more
significant than the Green Court Justices themselves realized. During
the 1960's not a single state civil liberties decision was reversed on the
ground that federal civil liberties standards were exceeded.2 8 Indeed,
during this period only four state initiated appeals were accepted for
review; in three of these cases, the state court judgment was affirmed 2 9
and in one, the judgment was vacated to determine whether the decision rested on an independent state ground."
Whereas the Warren Court only reversed state court decisions for
tolerating less than the Bill of Rights was held to require, the Burger
Court increasingly turned its attention to defining the outer reaches of
federal civil liberties requirements. During the past thirteen Terms,
120 out of a total of 427 state initiated petitions-twenty-eight percent-were either reversed, vacated or granted full review. The Justices' willingness to review and reverse over one out of four petitions
brought by state officials contrasts sharply with the relative lack of success experienced by civil liberties claimants. During the same period, a
total of 2,250 paid petitions were filed, of which 120--or five percentwere reversed, vacated or granted full review.
Figure 1 shows the relative success experienced by state officials
and civil liberties claimants in gaining access to the High Court. Observe that with the exception of the 1971 and 1976 Terms, state officials
were uniformly more successful in obtaining some form of favorable
action3 1 by the Court. The overall trend throughout the period is unmistakably toward greater success for state officials as opposed to more
restrictive access-and finally a complete denial of access during the
1982 Term-for civil liberties claimants.
26. Id. at 153.
27. Id. at 172 (Harlan, J., concurring).
28. See Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of UnderenforcedConstitutionalNorms,
91 HARv. L. REa. 1212, 1244 n.101 (1978).
29. Central School Dist. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967); California v. Stewart, 384 U.S. 436 (1965).
30. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194, 197 (1965).
31. For an explanation of the term "favorable" as used here, see supra note 22.
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The differential treatment accorded petitioners is most pronounced
during the past six Terms. Whereas the Justices reviewed thirty-eight
percent of all petitions brought by state officials (93 out of 246), civil
liberties claimants had less than four percent of their petitions reviewed
(37 out of 1088). Thus, state initiated petitions, which made up roughly
eighteen percent of all appeals from state civil liberties judgments, constituted over seventy percent of the state cases receiving federal review.
The success experienced by state officials is also reflected in the
growing volume of state initiated petitions during the period of study.32
In the 1970 Term only thirteen such petitions were filed; yet this figure
rose steadily throughout the 1970's to the point where eighty petitions
32. The following table reports the number of state initiated appeals filed during this 13
Term period:
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
12

14

17

31

27

24

1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
23

33

25

45

77

48

1982
46
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were filed during the 1980 Term. For the last two Terms, the number
of petitions has declined to an average of forty-seven per Term. The
increase in petitions brought by civil liberties claimants was proportionately much smaller. As Figure 2 documents, state initiated appeals
have constituted an ever larger share of the total number of civil liberties petitions coming from state courts-from seven percent in the 1970
Term to twenty-six percent last Term.
Figure 2
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The increasing scrutiny given expansive state civil liberties judgments has not only served to stimulate the number of state initiated
appeals, it has led to a curious transformation of the relationship between the Supreme Court and state courts. The federal judiciary,
tutored under the liberal activism of the Warren Court, became the
refuge for the individual, especially minorities and politically powerless
groups within society.3 3 State courts, reflecting traditional patterns of
dominance and dependence, were considered to be insensitive to the
growing demand for a just and more equitable social order. The Bill of
Rights became the instrument by which the Court sought to check state
governmental usurpations and advance social and political
34
egalitarianism.
It was no doubt inevitable that the pace of social change instituted
during the Warren years would at some point begin to slow, and that in
33. See G.

WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, 317-68 (1976).
34. For a theory of judicial review which supports this role for the Court, see J. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST

73-104 (1981).
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some areas even the direction of civil liberties decisionmaking would
be altered. But it was not so clear that the Court would chart this new
course by closing access to civil liberties claimants, and become instead
the last resort for state officials complaining that state courts had gone
too far in protecting rights. Yet this is exactly what has occurred. Last
Term, close to four out of ten state initiated petitions were acted upon
by the Court. By contrast, not a single petition filed by an individual
rights petitioner was reviewed.3 5
General statistics tell only part of the story. Equally significant is
the manner in which the Court has exercised its review of state civil
liberties judgments. One can identify two distinguishing features: the
summary character of review and the intensity of review. Both of these
features contribute to the success that state officials have had in overturning expansive state court decisions.
A.

The Summary Character of Burger Court Review

Dissenting in Idaho Departmentof Employment v. Smith,36 Justice
Stevens criticized the Court's increasing willingness to reverse summarily expansive state judgments. The Justice wrote: "Whenever we attempt [to overturn state decisions summarily] we court the danger of
either committing error ourselves or of confusing rather than clarifying
the law."' 37 The error to which Stevens referred was the rendering of a
decision in a case which, so far as the Justices knew, rested on an independent state ground. Determining the basis of a state court's judgment is a difficult task even with the benefit of full briefs and
argumentation; without them the risk of error is substantially increased. In the Smith case the risk was especially high because the respondent had been too poor to hire a lawyer to file a brief opposing the
state's petition for certiorari.
Since Smith, Justice Stevens has on several occasions reiterated his
opposition to the Court's practice of summarily reversing state civil lib35. The following table reports the number of state versus individual petitions reviewed
by the Court:

State Petitions

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

16

10

28

21

18

10

4

0

Individual
Petitions
7
10
36. 434 U.S. 100 (1977) (per curiam).
37. Id. at 104 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
38. Id.
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erties decisions.39 In State ex rel Cooper v. MitchellBrothersSantaAna

Theater,4" Stevens dissented from the Court's per curiam opinion overturning a California Court of Appeal decision that required city officials to prove obscenity beyond a reasonable doubt before an adult
theater could be closed down as a public nuisance. The Justice argued
that "the Court ha[d] no jurisdiction to express [its opinion on this case]
unless the California courts imposed [the beyond a reasonable doubt]
standard because they understood it to be required by federal law" and
in this instance "it [was] by no means clear" that they felt so
constrained.41
The fact that the state court opinion had extensively discussed federal law was not decisive; what was crucial was whether state judges
believed they were commanded by federal law to reach the conclusion
they did. "State courts surely know the difference between opinions
that merely contain persuasive reasoning and opinions that are authoritative because they explain a rule that is binding on lower courts," Stevens wrote.42 Turning to the state court opinion in Cooper,the Justice
observed:
The explanation by the California Court of Appeal of its ruling on the standard-of-proof.

.

.[is] based on the reasoning of

Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in McKinney v. Alabama . ...

After citing People v. Frangadakis, ... and re-

jecting the City Attorney's argument that the standard of proof
required in normal public nuisance abatement actions should be
applied in an obscenity case, the California Court of Appeal
stated that it "agree[d]" with the burden of proof portion of Justice Brennan's opinion and found one passage "particularly
persuasive."43
The mere fact that Justice Brennan's McKinney opinion could not command the support of five members of the Court, Stevens can be heard
to say, does not afford an adequate basis for striking down the California court's decision. That the state judges were persuaded by Brennan's reasoning rather than compelled by the Court's ruling should be
sufficient to insulate their decision from review.
39. See California ex rel Cooper v. Mitchell Bros. Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 9495 (1981) (per curiam) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449
U.S. 456, 478 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 116
(1977) (per curiam) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens expressed these views in an
address before the American Judicature Society in San Francisco on August 6, 1982. See
L.A. Daily J., Aug. 18, 1982, at 4, col. 3.
40. 454 U.S. 90 (1981) (per curiam).
41. Id. at 96.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 96-97.
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Summary reversals of expansive civil liberties decisions increase
the possibility that the Court will issue what may amount to no more
than advisory opinions;44 more generally they convey a hostility toward
state court innovation that seems inconsistent with the Court's own
stated commitment to federalism and decentralized decisionmaking.
45
Decentralization, Stevens correctly noted in Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
not only serves the interests of autonomous state court decisionmaking,
it also promotes informed decisionmaking at the national level: "In
.. . constitutional adjudication, . . . it is of paramount importance
that the Court have the benefit of differing judicial evaluations of an
issue before it is finally resolved on a nationwide basis."' 46 The continued participation by state courts, Stevens goes on to say, is jeopardized
when the overriding message the Court communicates to state judges is
that they should not be too concerned with protecting individual
rights-that in most contests between state officials and private rights
claimants, the interests of the former should take precedence over the
rival concerns of the latter: "[T]his Court's random and spasmodic efforts to correct errors summarily may create the unfortunate impression
that the Court is more interested in upholding the power of the State
than in vindicating individual rights."4 7 Reversing expansive state civil
liberties rulings without the benefit of full review constitutes more than
an expression of the Justices' views on the merits; it reflects their hostility to the entire enterprise itself.
Justice Stevens' concern with the summary reversal of state court
decisions is borne out by the data gathered in this study. Of the 101
recorded reversals of expansive state judgments, 71 or roughly seventy
percent were accomplished without full briefs or argumentation.48 Despite Stevens' protests, the trend toward summary reversal has actually
increased during the last three Terms: a total of forty-one summary
reversals were handed down as compared to eleven following full review.49 During the same period, the Court summarily reversed twelve
state court decisions challenged by civil liberties claimants, while another eleven reversals were obtained after full review.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 67-76.
45. 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam).
46. Id. at 117 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. Idaho Dep't of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100, 104-05 (1977) (per curiam).
48. The Court's all-too-ready use of summary reversals suggests that the Justices are
more interested in curbing state judicial activisim than in declaring general constitttional
principles.
49. It is interesting to note that over half the summary reversals of expansive state court
opinions occurred in the 1978-80 Terms.
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The Intensive Character of Burger Court Review

In the Green case,50 the implicit justification offered by the Court
for overturning of the California Supreme Court's decision was the belief that the state court had been misled by recent federal precedents
into thinking that the Confrontation Clause required the exclusion of
the witness' previous cross-examined testimony. The Burger Court,
however, has not limited its review of expansive state court decisions to
instances in which the state court incorrectly believed it was compelled
to reach the result it did. Rather, the criterion that has apparently
guided the Court in exercising its review authority has been whether
five of its members would have reached the same result as did the state
court-a criterion which authorizes a far more intensive form of the
review than the Green mistake of law standard.
The Court's decision in Oregon v. Hass is illustrative.' In Hass,
the Court reversed an Oregon Supreme Court decision for failing to
follow the Court's earlier holding in Harrisv. New York. 52 Harrisheld
that incriminating remarks obtained by police pursuant to incomplete
Miranda warnings, while inadmissible in the prosecution's case in
chief, might nonetheless be introduced to impeach the defendant's trial
testimony. The Oregon Supreme Court distinguished Harris on the
ground that the police had interrogated Hass after he had been properly warned and had invoked his right to consult with an attorney,
whereas Harris had made incriminating remarks after receiving incomplete warnings. The court reasoned that in Harris-typesituations, "the
police do not know whether or not they will get incriminating information from the defendant if they give the required warnings' 5 3 and the
mere possibility of obtaining evidence to be used for impeachment purposes will not be a sufficient inducement to fail to give proper warnings. By contrast, once Hass invoked his Miranda rights, it was
unlikely the police would get anything further from the defendant and
"therefore they [have] nothing to lose and something to gain by violating Miranda if the State is permitted to use such information as was
secured by continued interrogation for impeachment purposes. 5 4
Thus, in order to remove any incentive created by the Harris case's
impeachment exception, the court concluded that "the prophylactic ex50. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
51. 420 U.S. 714 (1975). The Oregon and United States Supreme Courts differ in their
spelling of the defendant-respondent's name. For purposes of this Article the version
adopted by the United States Supreme Court will be used.
52. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
53. State v. Hass, 267 Or. 489, 492, 517 P.2d 671, 673 (1973).
54. Id. at 493, 517 P.2d at 673.
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clusion of the evidence as dictated by Miranda. .. is still required."5 5
One need not believe that the state court's reasoning was faultless
or that another court might not just as reasonably have reached a different conclusion to recognize that the Oregon court's Hass decision
was an honest attempt to apply the principles of Miranda to a situation
that was not expressly covered by Harris. Further, it is apparent that
the state court's decision was not reached on the basis of a mistaken
belief that it was compelled to do so under applicable federal precedent. Harris provided ample justification for reaching the opposite
conclusion had the state court so desired. Instead, the court decided
that a mechanical application of Harriswould undermine the deterrent
purposes of the exclusionary rule.
The central question before the Supreme Court in Hass was
whether the Fifth Amendment permitted the state court to make that
decision. Speaking for himself and five of his colleagues, Justice Blackmun ruled that the state court was not so permitted. Perhaps the most
striking feature of Blackmun's opinion is the casual way he dismissed
the state court's opinion as an impermissible reading of Harris. Blackmun evidenced no interest in truly participating in a dialogue on the
merits of the state court's approach; he seemed more interested in establishing that the Supreme Court would have the final say in the matter. "[A] State may not impose such greater restrictions as a matter of
federalconstitutionallaw when this Court specifically refrains from imposing them," Blackmun declared.56 But there is no evidence that the
Oregon Supreme Court understood itself to be expanding federal rights
beyond what the Supreme Court would tolerate; its Hass decision was
no gesture of defiance.
Blackmun's two paragraph response to the state court's reasoning
raised more questions than it answered. The Justice wrote: "One
might concede that when proper Miranda warnings have been given,
and the officer then continues his interrogation after the suspect asks
for an attorney, the officer may be said to have little to lose and perhaps
something to gain by way of possibly uncovering impeachment material."5 7 Having made this admission, Blackmun then seemed to concede everything, for he observed that "[t]his speculative possibility,
however, is even greater where the warnings are defective and the defect is not known to the officer."5 " In other words, once one accepts the
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
420 U.S. at 719 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 723.
Id.

832

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 10:819

proposition that permitting the introduction of statements that violate
Miranda for impeachment purposes will serve as an inducement for
police to violate the rights of suspects, then it follows that Harris is
inconsistent with, and actually undermines, Miranda. Surely this was
an important concession, even if only for the purposes of argument; it
would seem to call for some kind of reasoned response. But no such
response was forthcoming. Instead, the entire issue was simply dismissed with the following 6ise dixit: "In any event, the balance was
struck in Harris, and we are not disposed to change it now."59
What did state courts learn from Oregon v. Hass? They were
taught very little about how to apply the Court's Harris decision, but a
great deal about the Justices' personal antipathy toward Miranda and
their unwillingness to extend Miranda's prohibitions to the impeachment context. While Harris has been criticized by commentators for
being unprincipled,60 it would be incorrect to characterize Hass as being either principled or unprincipled. Strictly speaking, Hass is
aprincipled. There is really no attempt to be principled; there is instead
the desire to communicate to state courts that the Court will brook no
dissension over the admission of statements obtained in violation of
Miranda to impeach the defendant's credibility.
The Court's approach in Hass typifies the current interaction between the Supreme Court and many state courts. The Justices routinely reverse state civil liberties judgments without openly considering
the impact of federal intervention on state civil liberties development.61
Nor have the Justices felt it necessary to go beyond the assertion '62
in
Hass that "because we have the power to review, we will review."
However one settles the question of the authority to review these state
decisions,63 the question of whether such review is a wise use of federal
judicial power remains. Should the Court be exercising its certiorari
jurisdiction to encourage state courts to pull in the reins on the devel59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Ely & Dershowitz, Hams v. New York: Some Anxious Observationson the
Candor andLogic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971).
61. See the discussion of the impact of the Court's intervention in Oregon v. Kennedy,
456 U.S. 667 (1982) and infra text accompanying notes 269-72.
62. The single exception is Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Michigan v.
Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3474-78 (1983). For a brief discussion of the Long decision, see infra
text accompanying notes 129-31.
63. This Article does not question the Court's authority to review state judgments vindicating civil liberties, but merely the propriety of exercising review, given the Justices' stated
allegiance to the principles of federalism. However, the authority question is far from settled. See Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Relationshp Between State and Federal
Courts: A Critique ofMichigan v. Long, 59 NOTRE DAME L.J. (1984).
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opment of civil liberties law? Is subjecting state judgments protecting
rights to exacting judicial scrutiny consistent with the Court's pronouncements on federalism and preserving state court autonomy?
II. The Court's Treatment of Ambiguously Grounded State
Civil Liberties Judgments
Ascertaining the correct body of law relied on by state courts is
crucial to the Supreme Court's determination of whether it may exercise jurisdiction over the case. Under the adequate state ground doctrine, state court judgments resting on an independent body of state law
are constitutionally immune from federal judicial review, provided, of
course, that they do not disparage any federal right or privilege. This
section opens with a discussion of the adequate state ground doctrine
and its importance in fostering independent constitutional interpretation. Next, the various techniques developed by the Court for handling
ambiguous state court decisions are examined in terms of their effect on
state court autonomy as well as in terms of the conception of federal/state court relations on which they are premised. Finally, the section focuses on the Burger Court's handling of ambiguously grounded
decisions, and appraises the impact Supreme Court intervention has
had upon state court decisionmaking.
A.

The Adequate State Ground Doctrine: Delimiting the Scope of the
Supreme Court's Jurisdiction Over State Courts

The authority of state courts to interpret independently their own
constitutions has its origins in the nature of our federal system. Historically, the doctrine of federalism has rested on the proposition that
"diffusing power by allocating separate functions to the national and
constituent states is a bulwark of individual liberties."'
Federalism's
solicitude for decentralization, however, has never been unbridled.
State courts may not, under the guise of federalism, interpret state constitutional guarantees so as to contravene minimum federal constitutional requirements.6 5 But state courts are free to interpret state
guarantees to afford their citizens greater protections than the Supreme
Court mandates under the Bill of Rights. This one way relationship
between state and federal courts has been described as follows:
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to prescribe only the
minimum that a state must grant. It does not have the authority
64. Scheiber, FederalismandLegal Process: Historicaland ContemporaryAnalysisofthe
American System, 14 LAW & Soc'y REv. 663, 690 (1980).
65. See Developments in the Law, supra note 8, at 1333.
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to establish the maximum. Although a state court cannot expand
a state provision to the point where it conflicts with a counter-

vailing federal right, short of such a collision the states have the
power to enlarge
individual liberties as much as they deem
66
appropriate.

The autonomy granted state courts under the adequate state
ground doctrine extends not only to cases in which the judgment is

based exclusively on state law but also to instances where both state
and federal law are involved. So long as the state ground is truly adequate67 and independent 68 of the federal issue, then review by the
Supreme Court is prohibited even where the Court believes that federal

law has been erroneously interpreted. This latter prohibition is derived
from the ban on advisory opinions. As Justice Jackson explained in
Herb v. Pitcairn:69
Our only power over state judgments is to correct them to
the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights. And our
power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions. We
are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same
judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected
its views of federal laws, our review
could amount to nothing
7
more than an advisory opinion. 1
In the context of Supreme Court review over expansive state court
judgments, however, there is more at stake than concern about the
Court issuing an advisory opinion. Consider the case of Air Pollution
Variance Board v. Western Alfafa Corp.,71 in which the Court ruled
that a state health inspector did not violate the Fourth Amendment
when he entered the company's property without consent and conducted a visual inspection of smoke emitted from the company's chimneys. In reversing a Colorado Court of Appeals decision, Justice
Douglas declared that "[diepending upon the layout of the plant, the
inspector may operate within or without the premises but in either case
he is well within the 'open fields' exception to the Fourth Amendment
approved in Hester [v. United States]. ' 72 Having disposed of the
Fourth Amendment claim, Douglas then observed that the state court
had also ruled that the pollution inspector's failure to notify the corn66. Project Report, Toward an Activist Rolefor State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 271, 285 (1973).
67. See cases and authorities discussed in R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE § 3.32 (5th ed. 1978).
68. See cases and authorities discussed id., at § 3.33.
69. 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
70. Id. at 125-26.

71. 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
72. Id. at 865.
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pany of the tests "lacked the fundamental elements of due process."7 3
Being unable to determine "[w]hether the Court [of Appeals] referred
to Colorado 'due process' or Fourteenth Amendment 'due process,' "7
he concluded that the case should be remanded to the state court with
instructions to specify whether the decision rested on an independent
state ground.
On remand, the Court of Appeals reinstated its original judgment,
declaring that, "our decision is compelled by both the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section
25 of the Colorado Constitution."7 5 As a formal matter, it would appear that Western Alfalfa was purely an advisory opinion. 76 As a practical matter, however, it was much more than that. It was an official
determination by the Court that the principles and policies embodied
in the Fourth Amendment do not mandate imposition of a warrant
requirement on pollution inspectors. Henceforth, state courts considering whether pollution inspections should be held to search and seizure
standards must confront what, for all intents and purposes, is an authoritative decision by the Supreme Court exempting such inspections
from Fourth Amendment requirements.
The Western Afafa case points up an aspect of the adequate state
ground doctrine that has not been fully appreciated: the adverse impact that Supreme Court pronouncements limiting the scope of federal
constitutional protections can have on innovative state court decisionmaking. It should come as no surprise to find that most state courts
that have considered analogous issues involving governmental visual
surveillance have followed Western Alfafa.77 Several have gone so far
as to suggest that such surveillance is completely immune from constitutional restriction. One state court, for example, interpreted Western
Alfafa as holding that "no invasion of constitutionally protected privacy [occurs] in observing what is visible for all to see," 7 8 and another
concluded that such forms of governmental surveillance only present
73. Id.
74. Id. at 866.
75. Western Alfalfa Corp. v. Air Pollution Variance Bd., 35 Colo. App. 207,210-11,534
P.2d 796, 799 (1975).
76. See Commonwealth v. Baldwin, I1 Mass. App. Ct. 386, 416 N.E.2d 544 (1981);
Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 277 S.E.2d 923 (1981); State v. Osborn, 63 Ohio Misc.
17, 409 N.E.2d 1077 (1980); Giddens v. State, 156 Ga. App. 258, 274 S.E.2d 595 (1980);
Lupro v. State, 603 P.2d 468 (Alaska 1979).
77. Lupro v. State, 603 P.2d 468 (Alaska 1979); State v. Larkin, 588 S.W.2d 544 (Tenn.
1979).
78. Lupro, 603 P.2d at 477 (upholding warrantless search of exterior of impounded
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abstract and theoretical invasions of privacy.7 9
In the post-incorporation era, state courts have come to accept
Supreme Court opinions as embodying the first and last word on civil
liberties. There is a reluctance to depart from Court rulings limiting
rights and a greater reluctance to consider novel approaches once the
Court has issued its view of the matter. The following statement by a
California Court of Appeal is, unfortunately, all too typical of the attitudes of many state judges:
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing
constitutional phraseology are highly persuasive . . . . By the
nature of federal and state jurisdiction the court has acquired a
degree of expertise not shared by any state court. Matters of constitutional import are likely to reach the United States high court
on a cleaner record and to be better briefed and argued than are
similar issues in the state system. . . . The more courts feel free
to adopt ground rules unpersuaded by contrary decisions of other
courts, the greater the likelihood there is of uncertainty in those
ground rules. The uncertainty is mitigated ifrAroper deference is
paid United States Supreme Court holdings.'
It is understandable that state judges accustomed to acquiescing to
Supreme Court decisions expanding rights should similarly close ranks
behind the Justices when they reverse ground. This does not mean that
it is defensible. "First Things First," instructs Justice Hans Linde, who
reminds state judges that "state bills of rights are first in two senses:
first in time and in logic."8 If state judges would begin to consider the
independent guarantees afforded citizens under the state constitution
before they consulted the latest Supreme Court pronouncement on the
subject, they might just be surprised at the wealth of civil liberties
treasures they would discover.8 2 Indeed, taking state constitutional
guarantees seriously might prompt state courts to follow the lead of the
Oregon Supreme Court which has declared that its "first obligation is
to determine the law of Oregon before reaching the fourteenth
amendment."8 3
79. Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 478, 277 S.E.2d 923, 925 (1981) (upholding
police observation of marijuana from airplane).
80. People v. Norman, 112 Cal. Rptr. 43,48-49 (1974), vacated, 14 Cal. 3d 929,538 P.2d
237, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109 (1975).
81. Linde, supra note 8, at 383.
82. A number of state bills of rights offer civil liberties protections that have no federal
analogues. For a sampling of some of the different protections afforded under the state
constitution, see Welsh & Collins, Taking State Constitutions Seriously, 14 THE CENTER
MAG. 6 (Sept./Oct. 1981).
83. State v. Smith, 286 Or. 293, 297, 593 P.2d 1166, 1168 (1979); accord Sterling v.
Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 615, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (1981); State v. Scharf, 288 Or. 451, 454, 605 P.2d
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Rendering civil liberties decisions under the state constitution significantly alters the institutional relationship between state and federal
supreme courts. When a state supreme court rests its decision on an
interpretation of federal law, it assumes the character of an intermediate appellate court vis-a-vis the High Bench: the state court is bound to
follow operative Supreme Court precedents despite whatever misgivings it may have about the wisdom of the rulings themselves. Where a
state supreme court invokes state law, however, the institutional relationship is almost (but not quite) reversed.14 The state supreme court
now has the final say. As a result, United States Supreme Court decisions are no longer binding, but are instead regarded much the same
way as any "ultimate court" views the decisions of an "intermediate
court"-as persuasive but not authoritative pronouncements.
The "role reversal" that occurs when state supreme courts ground
their decisions in state constitutional provisions is illustrated by the following passage from the California Supreme Court's decision in People
v. Longwill.s5 Responding to the State's contention that a state court's
authority to engage in independent interpretation is confined to a few
"limited circumstances," 6 the majority correctly replied:
This argument presupposes that on issues of individual rights
we sit as no more than an intermediate appellate tribunal, and
that to the presumption of further review there is but a "limited"
exception which must be "clearly delineated." On the contrary,
in the area of fundamental civil liberties.

. .

we sit as a court of

last resort, subject only to the qualification that our interpretations may not restrict the guarantees accorded the national citi690, 691 (1980). The rationale behind the Oregon Supreme Court's policy of first addressing
state constitutional issues is explained in the following passage: "Before addressing [any]
federal issues, however, a court's responsibility is first to decide the effect of the state's own
laws, because if the state provides what defendant claims, it does not deprive her of the due
process commanded by the 14th Amendment. Conversely, a procedure not forbidden by the
United States Constitution is not by that fact 'authorized' in the absence of contrary state
law, for the Constitution only limits the actions of state officials; authority to take these
actions must be found in state law. . . .If the state law is determined to be adverse to [the]
defendant, of course, the federal issues remain to be decided. But the court will not needlessly interpret state law in a manner that would reach an unconstitutional result." Scharf,
288 Or. at 454-55, 605 P.2d at 691-92 (1980).
84. The relationship is not completely reversed because state courts may not interpret
their own constitutions to afford less protection than demanded by the Bill of Rights,
whereas the United States Supreme Court may interpret federal guarantees to afford less
than is guaranteed by state bills of rights. See Note, State ConstitutionalGuaranteesAs Adequate State Ground-Supreme Court Retiew and Problems of Federalism, 13 AM. CRIM. L.
Rav. 737, 763-71 (1976) (discussing whether federal courts should honor state guaranteed
rights).
85. 14 Cal. 3d 943, 538 P.2d 753, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1975).
86. Id. at 951 n.4, 538 P.2d at 758 n.4, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 302 n.4.

838

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 10:819

zenry under the federal charter. In such constitutional
adjudication, our first referent is California law and the full panoply of rights Californians have come to expect as their due.8 7
The decisions of the Supreme Court, the state justices concluded, "are
to be followed by California courts only when they provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by California law."8
There is a lesson here for the United States Supreme Court: just as
state courts should not blindly follow every pronouncement from
Washington, D.C., so too should the inhabitants of that marble temple
be careful not to exercise their jurisdiction so as to interrupt or thwart
the process by which state judges flesh out the independent guarantees
of their own declaration of rights. Viewed in this light, the adequate
state ground doctrine serves not only to guard against the issuance of
advisory opinions, but also to guarantee that state courts will be accorded the autonomy and independence necessary to begin to fashion
for themselves a separate jurisprudence of civil liberties.
B. Various Techniques for Handling Ambiguously Grounded State
Court Judgments
The Supreme Court has developed three techniques for responding to ambiguously grounded state cases: dismissal of the writ of certiorari; continuance of the petition until the party bringing the appeal
can obtain certification from the state court; and vacating the judgment
and remanding it to the state court to make clear the basis of its decision. Although some commentators have expressed puzzlement over
the Court's particular choice of technique, 9 arguably the selection is
made on the basis of the Court's perception of the importance of the
federal interest involved as well as its conception of appropriate federal/state court relations. In those cases in which the issue is deemed to
be within the primary competence of the states and the countervailing
federal interest is deemed to be negligible, the Court has generally resolved all ambiguity in favor of the independent basis and has dismissed the writ of certiorari. Where, however, the Justices concluded
that the federal interest was weighty enough to require some federal
judicial monitoring but were also concerned with preserving state court
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Note, Supreme Court Treatment of State Court Cases Erhibiting Ambiguous
Grounds of Deeision, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 822 (1962): "Why the Court selected one or the
other of these techniques in any given case is not clear, in part because the small number of
ambiguous grounds cases considered by the Court renders accurate synthesis impossible, in
part because, with the exception of Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion in Herb, the Court never
indicated the reasons for using the technique selected." Id. at 842 (footnote omitted).
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independence, the certification technique has been employed. Finally,
in those instances where the goal of national uniformity was deemed to
outweigh the competing state concerns, the Justices have resorted to the
vacate and remand method.
The present Court has chosen to handle ambiguously grounded
decisions expanding rights through the vacate and remand method.
This method is the one most likely to interfere with the process of independent constitutional interpretation at the state level. Moreover,
the Court has maintained its vacate and remand policy with apparent
ambivalence toward the important aspects of federalism implicated by
that policy. This suggests that the Court may perceive state court civil
liberties experimentation as somehow contrary to federal interests.
. Dismissalof the Writ of Certiorari
Until the 1930's, dismissal was the only method employed by the
Court for handling ambiguously grounded state court decisions. The
leading case employing this technique is Lynch v. New York ex rel.Pierson.9° Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Hughes concluded that the writ of certiorari had to be dismissed as improvidently
granted even though the state court opinion relied extensively on
Supreme Court decisions:
It is essential to the jurisdiction of this Court in reviewing a
decision of a court of a state that it must appear affirmatively
from the record, not only that a federal question was presented
for decision to the highest court of the state having jurisdiction,
but that its decision of the federal question was necessary to the
determination of the cause, and that it was actually decided or
that the judgment as rendered could not have been given without
deciding it.
So long as it was possible that the state court had relied on a nonfederal
ground, the Court was precluded from exercising jurisdiction.
Underlying this approach was a conception of federal/state court
relations premised on a "partnership model," 92 in which "the responsibility for protecting basic rights was divided" 93 between the Supreme
Court and the states. According to this perspective, the Supreme
Court's role in the civil liberties arena was limited to guaranteeing only
those rights which "existed by virtue of the government's 'national
90.
91.
92.
93.

293 U.S. 52 (1934).
Id. at 54.
Project Report, supra note 66, at 279.
Id. at 282.
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character.' ,94 Vindicating this select, if ill-defined, set of national
rights was not thought to require significant federal oversight and, because of the deference traditionally accorded state courts as "the dominant partners in the bill of rights enterprise," 95 the Justices were willing
to grant litigants only the most limited opportunity to challenge state
activities under the Bill of Rights.
Another important ingredient of this model was trust in the willingness of state courts to protect civil rights. In Woods v. Nierstheimer,96 for example, the Court dismissed its original grant of
certiorari to consider the claims of a state prisoner who contended that
he had been physically coerced by police officers into signing a confession to murder. Declaring that these allegations, if proved, "would
show that conviction and sentencing of the petitioner violated the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,"9 the Court nonetheless
concluded that the state court's refusal to overturn the conviction was
probably based on the fact that, under state law, petitioner had applied
for the wrong kind of relief. Even though a significant federal constitutional issue was presented in the case, the Court was unwilling to assume jurisdiction without requiring the petitioner to first present a
proper appeal to the state court. "We cannot assume that Illinois
would so far depart from its general appellate procedure as to deny
appellate review of orders denying applications for habeas corpus, if
such applications were the proper procedure for challenging violations
of fundamental rights of life and liberty guaranteed by the United
States Constitution. '98 Similarly in Phyle v. Duffy, 99 a case involving a
challenge brought by a state prisoner under a death sentence, the writ
was dismissed after the court concluded that the state court had based
its adverse decision on the prisoner's failure to request the correct remedy under state law. Writing separately, Justice Frankfurter made explicit the extent to Which the Court's dismissal was premised on further
remedial action being undertaken by the state court:
Whatever may be the elegancies of procedure by which the matter is to be determined, our decision declining to consider the
grave constitutional issues which we thought we had before us, is
contingent upon a determination by the Supreme Court of California that the law of that State is what our decision presupposes
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873)).
Id.
328 U.S. 211 (1946).
Id. at 214.
Id. at 216.
334 U.S. 431 (1948).
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it to be, namely that California by a remedy which California
chooses to call mandamus enables the present petitioner to secure
a judicial determination of his present sanity °
2. Cerflcation
Beginning in the 1940's and accelerating with the nationalization
of the Bill of Rights, a "national model"10' supplanted the traditional
model of divided responsibility and, as a result, federal dominance over
civil liberties was firmly established. One can identify at least three
primary factors that contributed to the tremendous growth of federal
judicial power over the states. First, Americans no longer identified
with the historical distrust of national governmental power which had
fueled much of the concern with protecting state autonomy. Second,
the Justices no longer believed that state courts could be trusted with
the protection of fundamental national rights. Third, twentieth century
America was no longer a collection of states loosely held together by a
weak national state. Increasingly, states were perceived as anachronistic and out of step with the dominant technological, economic and
political forces of nationalism. "In a country where transcontinental
travel was commonplace, state to state variation in fundamental rights
was intolerable."'10 2
The collapse of the partnership model also resulted in judicial experimentation with alternative techniques for handling ambiguously
grounded state court decisions. In Herb v. Pitcairn,0 3 the Court
adopted the method of having the petitioner obtain a certificate from
the state court indicating whether its decision was based on an independent state ground. The petitioner had brought a cause of action
in state courts under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) for
an injury suffered while working as a switchman with the Wabash
Railroad. The original award of $30,000 had been overturned by the
Illinois Supreme Court because the trial court had lacked jurisdiction
to entertain the suit. The defendant then moved to have the suit dismissed because no action had been brought before a court competent to
decide the case within the two year period specified by the FELA The
trial court granted defendant's motion and was upheld on appeal by
the Illinois Supreme Court.
In ruling that under the FELA claimants must institute action in a
state court having competent jurisdiction within the two year limitation
100. Id. at 445 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
101. Project Report, supra note 66, at 283.
102. Id. at 283-84. See generally Scheiber, supra note 64.

103. 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
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period, the state court had passed on an important question of federal
law. Despite this fact, the Supreme Court felt it did not necessarily
have jurisdiction to hear the case. Before the power to review could be
conclusively established, the Court had to satisfy itself that the decision
rested entirely on federal law. Uncertainty over this point led the Justices to conclude that the proper course was to continue the case on the
Court's docket until the petitioner had an opportunity to obtain clarification from the state supreme court.
Two arguments were advanced in support of this procedure. First,
it was contended that certification is the only option available to the
Court in those cases involving a possible independent state ground. So
long as there remained a possibility that the state court rested its decision on state law, any assumption of jurisdiction by the Court-even if
only to vacate the judgment and remand to the state court-would be
an unwarranted intrusion of federal judicial power. Presumably, this is
what Justice Jackson meant when he said that "in cases where [the basis for the decision] is not clear to us, it seems consistent with the respect due the highest courts of states of the Union that they be asked
rather than told what they have intended. ' 1°4 This sentiment is even
more forcefully expressed in a subsequent case,10 5 in which Jacksonwriting in dissent-declared that "[d]oubt of our jurisdiction is no justification for exercising it; quite the contrary is the rule."1 6
Second, Jackson argued that ambiguously grounded state court
opinions should not be viewed as unwarranted obstacles in the exercise
of Supreme Court jurisdiction but as reflecting a somewhat different
though quite acceptable orientation toward the state courts' dual responsibility under federal and state law. "It is no criticism of a state
court," wrote Jackson, "that we are unable to say in a case [involving]
both state and federal questions. . ., that judgment would have been
the same had only one of the grounds been present."'"" Since relevant
state and federal law often parallel and reinforce each other, state
judges will not always be careful to distinguish between the federal and
state basis of their decisions. In Jackson's view, the obligation to distinguish between state and federal law rests primarily with the Supreme
Court, and derives from its "duty to refrain from interfering in state
law questions and also to review federal ones without making a deter104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 127-28.
Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U.S. 143 (1952).
Id. at 147 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
324 U.S. at 127.
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mination whether the one or the other controls the judgment."'' 0 8
3. Vacation and Remand
Judicial employment of the techniques of dismissal and certification reflects a common concern with minimizing federal judicial interference with state court decisionmaking. The third techniquevacating the state court judgment and remanding the case with instructions to make clear the basis of the judgment-seems much less concerned with preserving state autonomy than with ensuring that the
Supreme Court shall have the final say over the interpretation of federal law.
The first case in which the Court employed the vacate and remand
technique as a way of clarifying the basis of the state court's decision
was Minnesota v. National Tea Co.' °9 The Court remanded a Minnesota Supreme Court decision declaring unconstitutional a state statute
imposing a graduated gross sales tax on retail chain stores. What
makes the case so interesting is that the Court acknowledged that the
state supreme court found the statute to violate both the Fourteenth
Amendment and article IX, section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution,
which provides that "taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of
subjects ... ."110
The only question about which the Court seemed in some doubt
was the reason that prompted the state court to invoke the state constitution. Justice Douglas wrote:
In support of this position [that the Minnesota Supreme Court
decision rested on an adequate state ground and was therefore
immune from review] they point to the court's discussion of the
Minnesota constitution and to the fact that the syllabus states that
such a tax is violative of both the federal and state constitutions.
But as to the latter we are not referred to any Minnesota authority which, as in some states, makes the syllabi the law of the case.
And as to the former the opinion is quite inconclusive. For the
opinion as a whole leaves the impression that the court probably
felt constrained to rule as it did because of the five decisions
which it cited and which held such gross sales taxes unconstitutional by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment. That is at least
the meaning, if the words used are taken literally. For if, as
stated by the court, the 'precise question here presented' was
ruled by those five cases, that question was a federal one. And in
that connection it is perhaps significant that the court stated not
108. Id.
109. 309 U.S. 551 (1940).
110. MINN. CONsT. art. IX,

§ 1.
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only that it 'should follow' those decisions but that 'it is our duty
to do so.'
Enough has been said to demonstrate that there is considerable uncertainty as to the precise grounds for the decision.1"1 '
Douglas did not doubt that the state court's decision rested in part on
the state constitution. What was unclear was whether the state court
had sought to apply a preferred rule, shaped by what it understood to
be the requirements of federal law. In this respect, National Tea was a
truly revolutionary decision. Prior to this decision, the mere presence
of an adequate nonfederal ground had usually been sufficient to trigger
the adequate state ground doctrine. In National Tea, Douglas informed state judges that in addition to explicitly invoking nonfederal
grounds, they had to recite their nonfederal reasons for doing so or else
the Supreme Court would review.
Chief Justice Hughes, joined by Justices Stone and Roberts, filed a
strongly worded dissent objecting to the Court's conducting an inquiry
into the reasons behind the state court's decision to invoke state law.
The fact that provisions of the state and federal constitutions
may be similar or even identical does not justify us in disturbing
a judgment of a state court which adequately rests upon its application of the provision of its own constitution. That the state
court may be influenced by the reasoning of our opinions makes
no difference. The state court may be persuaded by majority
opinions in this Court or it may prefer the reasoning of dissenting
judges, but the judgment of the state court upon the application
of its own constitution remains a judgment which we are without
jurisdiction to review." 2
Hughes also pointed out that past decisions of the Minnesota Supreme
Court made clear that state judges fully understood the consequence of
resting a decision upon their own constitution. Hence, there was no
danger that the court felt "constrained" or "obligated" to interpret its
own constitution to conform to what it took to be federal requirements.
Hughes, rather than Douglas, proved to be correct. On remand
the court reinstated its original decision under state law.1 3 Reflecting
111. 309 U.S. at 554-55.
112. Id. at 558-59.
113. On remand the Minnesota Supreme Court declared: "If we were in error, assuredly
the opportunity to be set aright should be cheerfully and thankfully accepted. Having so reexamined them, we conclude that our prior decision was right. There is no need of further
discussion of the problems presented for the former opinion adequately covers the ground.
We think that the section of the statute here involved . . . is violative of the uniformity
clause of our own Constitution." National Tea Co. v. State, 208 Minn. 607, 608, 294 N.W.
230, 231 (1940) (per curiam).
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on this matter some thirty-four years later in DepartmentofMotor Vehicles v. Rios, Douglas came around to Hughes' position:
Minnesota v. National Tea Co.. . . taught me that it is wise to
insist that cases taken from a state court be clearly decided on a
federal ground and not, as here, on both state and federal
grounds, save where the state and federal questions are so intertwined as to make the state ground not an independent matter."14
Douglas' reappraisal, it should be pointed out, occurred in a case involving Supreme Court review over a state court decision expanding
civil liberties. 15
Not surprisingly, one's view of the appropriateness of the vacate
and remand method will vary depending on one's assessment of the
threat posed by the state court decision to countervailing federal interests. "6 Those who favor the dismissal and certification techniques are
primarily concerned with preserving state court autonomy; advocates
of the vacate and remand method tend to view state courts less as autonomous decisionmakers than as obstacles in the way of federal judicial review. The decision to vacate and remand a case serves two
related purposes. First, intervention informs state judges that the Justices regard the state judgment as sufficiently divergent from their own
views to warrant closer inspection and, second, the state court is given
the opportunity to reconsider the propriety of the original holding in
light of this expression of Supreme Court concern. In this way, it is
hoped, state courts will be discouraged
from invoking state law in order
1 17
to thwart federal judicial review.
114. 410 U.S. 425, 430 (1973).
115. Invoking the guarantee of due process, the California Supreme Court ruled that
prior to suspending a motorist's driver's license, the Department of Motor Vehicles must
conduct a hearing and that "at such a hearing the licensee is entitled to review the reports or
other evidence upon which the department contemplates determining that he is possibly
responsible for the accident, and to present reports or testimony to establish his claim of
non-culpability, allwithin reasonable due process procedures which the department may
employ." Rios v. Cozens, 7 Cal. 3d 792, 799, 499 P.2d 979, 984, 103 Cal. Rptr. 299, 304
(1972).
116. This certainly appears to be the case with Justice Rehnquist. In the 14 expansive
state court judgments vacated by the Court, the Justice never openly expressed any concern
with intruding upon state court autonomy. Yet in the single instance I have been able to
locate in which a state court judgment against the civil liberties claimant was vacated because the Court was unable to ascertain the basis for the decision, Rehnquist protested:
"The Court today summarily vacates the judgments of the State Supreme Court and remands for further proceedings. Neither past decisions of this Court nor policy considerations support this unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction and imposition on the state
courts." Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241, 242 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
117. This was Douglas' concern in National Tea, as is evident in his reminder to state
judges that "it is equally important that ambiguous or obscure adjudications by state courts
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Vacating and remanding ambiguous state court decisions stretches
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to its farthest limits consistent
with the basic terms of the adequate state ground doctrine. It is therefore the preferred method where the Court is seeking to impose uniform national standards. In striking a balance between the competing
concerns of protecting state autonomy and ensuring federal supremacy,
the vacate and remand technique clearly favors the latter over the former. Only those state court decisions that rest explicitly on state law

for reasons which are independent of the state judges' perceptions of
federal requirements will be permitted to depart from operative
Supreme Court pronouncements.
C. The Burger Court's Response
The Court established its policy of vacating and remanding expansive state court decisions in Californiav. Krivda. 11 In Krivda, the California Supreme Court had extended the privacy rationale of Katz v.
United States" 9 to include police searches of garbage cans. Stating
that they were unable to determine "whether the California Supreme
Court based its holding upon the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the Constitution of the United States, or upon the equivalent provi-

sion of the California Constitution, or both," 20
1 the Justices vacated the
judgment. On remand, the state high court reinstated the decision, declaring that it had relied "upon both the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, section 19, of the California

Constitution, and that accordingly the latter provision furnished an independent ground to support the result we reached in that opinion."''
The events that occurred in Krivda have been replayed many

times.12 2 State judgments containing one or more references to state
do not stand as barriers to a determination by this court of the validity under the federal
constitution of state action. Intelligent exercise of our appellate powers compels us to ask for
the elimination of the obscurities and ambiguities from the opinions in such cases. . . . For
no other course assures that important federal issues, such as have been argued here, will
reach this Court for adjudication; that state courts will not be the final arbiters of important
issues under the federal constitution; and that we will not encroach on the constitutional
jurisdiction of the states." 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940).
118. 409 U.S. 33 (1972).
119. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 62 (1971).
120. 409 U.S. at 35.
121. People v. Kxivda, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 624, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973).
122. Including Krivda, 409 U.S. at 33, at least 15 cases have been returned to state courts
because the Justices said they were unable to determine the basis of the state court judgment.
See Montana v. Jackson, 460 U.S. 1030 (1983); Michigan v. Hurd, 454 U.S. 807 (1981);
California v. Silver, 453 U.S. 918 (1981); Michigan v. Peques, 452 U.S. 934 (1981); Califor-
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law but lacking any separate discussion of the state claim routinely
have been returned by the Court for clarification. Almost as regularly,
state courts have reinstated their original judgments, 23 and in most instances the state tribunals did so by invoking an independent state
ground. 24 In only four instances state courts declared that their decision was based exclusively on federal law, 125 and in only two of those
instances the Court ultimately granted review.' 2 6
Where state courts invoke both state and federal sources, it is no
easy task to discern the exact point at which one body of law leaves off
and another begins. Nonetheless, the fact that the Supreme Court and
state courts disagreed almost sixty percent of the time suggests that the
Justices are not very good judges of whether an independent state
ground is present. Why has this problem in communication persisted
for so long? Is it that state judges are not speaking clearly enough? Or
is it that the Justices are not listening?
Actually, the problem is not so much poor communication as it is
divergent conceptions of the constitutional status of state law under the
Constitution. State judges apparently apply a conception of federal/state relations that presumes the independence of state law. State
judges are not mindless of the consequences of invoking their own constitution under the adequate state ground doctrine. Hence, when state
judges cite to the state constitution or declare, "we hold under our state
nia v. Level, 449 U.S. 945 (1980); California v. Superior Court, 449 U.S. 945 (1980); California v. Braeseke, 446 U.S. 932 (1980); Illinois v. Vitale, 439 U.S. 974 (1978); Percy v. Terry,
434 U.S. 808 (1977); Ohio v. Gallagher, 425 U.S. 257 (1976); Louisiana v. Mora, 423 U.S.
809 (1975); Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974); Pennsylvania v. Campana, 414 U.S. 808 (1973); Department of Motor Vehicles v. Rios, 410 U.S.
425 (1973).
123. Of the 13 cases for which state court responses have been located, the original judgment was reinstated in all but two cases. The two exceptions are People v. Level, 117 Cal.
App. 3d 462, 172 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1981) (in denying a hearing, the California Supreme Court
ordered that this opinion not be officially published) and State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255
(Mont. 1983).
124. State courts reaffirmed the independent basis of their holdings in eight cases. See
State v. Peques, 412 Mich. 851, 312 N.W.2d 83 (1982); People v. Superior Court (Engert),
120 Cal. App. 3d 721, 174 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1981); State v. Gallagher, 46 Ohio St. 2d 225, 348
N.E.2d 336 (1976); State v. Mora, 330 So. 2d 900 (La. 1976); Air Pollution Variance Bd. v.
Western Alfalfa Corp., 35 Colo. App. 207, 534 P.2d 796 (1975); Commonwealth v. Campana, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854 (1974); Rios v. Cozens, 9 Cal. 3d 593, 509 P.2d 696, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 784 (1976); People v. Krivda, 8 Cal. 3d 623,504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973). In
each instance the independent basis for the decision was indicated in the original decision.
125. State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255 (Mont. 1983); People v. Braeseke, 28 Cal. 3d 86, 618
P.2d 149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1980); State ex rel Terry v. Percy, 95 Wis. 2d 476, 290 N.W.2d
713 (1980); In re Vitale, 71 Il.2d 229, 375 N.E.2d 87 (1979).
126. Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980); Percy v. Terry, 443 U.S. 902 (1979). Not
surprisingly, the Court reversed the state court juagment in both instances.
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constitution .. ,,27 they usually mean what they say. Witness the
responses of state courts to the Burger Court's Krivda remands: in28most
cases state judges reiterated their original reliance on state law.'
If state judges assume the independence of state law, the Burger
Court assumes just the opposite. State law is presumed to be dependent on federal law unless state courts demonstrate otherwise. This is
29
the import of the Court's recent decision in Michigan v. Long.' Writing for the majority, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, herself a former
state judge, declared:
[W]hen. . .a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily
on federal law, or to be interwoven with federal law, and when
the adequacy and independence of any possible state ground is
not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most
reasonable explanation that the state court decided the way
it did
13
because it believed that federal law required it to do so. 0
Simply citing to the state constitution, Justice O'Connor informed state
judges, would not be sufficient to insulate a decision from review. State
judges must "make clear by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the Court has
reached."' 3 1 Absent such a "plain statement," state judgments will be
presumed to be reviewable.
A notable example of the Court's "presumption of dependence" is
the remand order in Montana v. Jackson, 32 a case involving the use of
a motorist's refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test in his trial for driving while under the influence of intoxicants. In ruling that a motorist's
refusal to undergo such a test is testimonial in nature and hence may
not be introduced as evidence, the Montana Supreme Court invoked
the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination no less than
seven times.' 3 3 The following quotations are a few examples:
[1] We hold that such refusal is testimonial in nature and that to
admit evidence of the fact of refusal would violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege as guaranteed by the United
States Constitution, and would further violate defendant's privilege as guaranteed by [Article] II, [section] 25 of the Montana
127. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 637 P.2d 1, 4 (Mont. 1981).
128. See supra notes 123-24.
129. 103 S.Ct. 3469 (1983).
130. Id. at 3476.
131. Id.
132. 460 U.S. 1030 (1983).
133. State v. Jackson, 637 P.2d 1,4-5 (Mont. 1981). For a discussion of the Jackson case,
see Collins, High Court Asserts Its Authority, Nat'l L.J., May 16, 1983, at 13.
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Constitution. 134
[2] The issue is also controlled by [Article] II, [section] 25 of our
own constitution, which provides that "No person shall be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal proceeding." The
issue involves a communication that is testimonial in nature, and
we must resolve the issue by applying [Article] II, [section] 25.
Clearly to permit evidence of defendant's refusal to take the
breathalyzer test would violate not only the United States Constitution, but also our own constitution.135
[3] We hold under our own constitution, that if a communication of refusal, whether written, verbal or otherwise involves the
defendant's consciousness of the facts and the operation of his
mind in36 expressing it, the communication is testimonial in
nature. 1
Despite these unequivocal references to state law, the Supreme Court
expressed uncertainty whether the reliance on state law was truly
137
independent.
Apparently, the Justices were troubled by an earlier state supreme
court decision, State v. Finley,131 which was brought to their attention
by the State Attorney General in his petition for certiorari. In Finley,
the Montana Supreme Court stated:
[T]he Montana constitutional guarantee of the privilege against
self-incrimination affords no broader protection to an accused
than does the Fifth Amendment. . . . The opinions of the
United States Supreme Court, therefore, delineate the maximum
39
breadth of the privilege against self-incrimination in Montana. 1
The State Attorney General argued in Jackson that since "the Montana
Court neither overruled nor disapproved . . . [the Finley] precedent,"' 14 the "state court in interpreting its own constitution ha[d] voluntarily chosen to adopt federal constitutional interpretations of a
-141
corresponding federal constitutional right ....
The Attorney General's petition failed to mention, however, that
the Finley dictum had been effectively undercut by Madison v.
Yunker. 14 2 Rejecting the Finley "no broader protection" thesis, the
134. 637 P.2d at 1.
135. Id. at 4.
136. Id. at 4-5.
137. Montana v. Jackson, 460 U.S. 1030 (1983).
138. 173 Mont. 162, 566 P.2d 1119 (1977).
139. Id. at 164, 566 P.2d at 1121.
140. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8, Montana v. Jackson,petionfor cert.filed, 50
U.S.L.W. 3696 (U.S. Feb. 13, 1982) (No. 81-1531).
141. Id. at 9.
142. 180 Mont. 54, 589 P.2d 126 (1978); quoted in Supplemental Brief of Amicus Curiae
American Civil Liberties Union, Montana Affiliate at 16, Montana v. Jackson, 460 U.S.
1030 (1983).
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Yunker Court declared:
[S]tate constitutional provisions [which are] identical or nearly
identical with language in the United States Constitution ...,
each constitute separate and enforceable constitutional rights insofar as the jurisdiction of Montana extends. Where state and
federal constitutional provisions are identical, each is enforceable
in its own respective sphere where those principles attach.' 4 '
Even the dissenting state justices in Jackson understood that Finley was
no longer controlling. "The majority holding," Chief Justice Haswell
declared, "extends the breadth of Montana's constitutional provision
beyond that afforded by the United States Constitution and overrules
sub silentio this Court's own interpretation of Montana's constitutional
privilege against self incrimination." '
There is no ambiguity-provided one were willing to take state
judges at their word.' 45 But such reliance on state courts is precisely
what the Supreme Court seems unwilling to do. Instead, the Justices
presumed that the state supreme court's reference to state law was dependent on its understanding of federal law-a presumption that even
repeated invocations of the state constitution were unable to overcome.
Apparently nothing less than an express and unequivocal disclaimer of
any reliance on federal precedents will guarantee the
"nonreviewability" of state court decisions.
The Burger Court's handling of Jackson suggests that the Justices
are being guided by considerations that have less to do with the ambiguity of a state court's decision than with hostility toward the merits of
the state court's holding. When the Court vacates a state judgment and
remands it for clarification, the state court is served notice that its reliance on the Bill of Rights was probably incorrect. Since the original
judgment is no longer in force, the state court is invited to reconsider its
143. 180 Mont. at 60, 589 P.2d at 129.
144. State v. Jackson, 637 P.2d 1, 7 (Mont. 1981) (Haswell, C.J., dissenting).
145. On remand, the Montana Supreme Court reversed its original holding and sustained the validity of the state statute. This prompted Justice Daniel Shea, author of the first
Jackson opinion to protest in dissent: "As the author of Jackson I, I clearly made a mistake,
for I did not recognize the extent to which the United States Supreme Court stood ready to
intrude on the judicial affairs of this state in interpreting our own constitution. However, the
remand order failed to analyze our decision, for to have done so would have been to recognize that we did indeed rely on Art. II, § 25, as an independent ground of decision. Instead,
the Supreme Court remanded the case to this Court to determine whether our decision 'was
based upon federal or state constitution grounds, or both,. . .' (emphasis added). A reading
of our decision should have told an objective United States Supreme Court that our decision
was based on both and that a decision based on our own constitution was sufficient for that
Court to deny certiorari." State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255, 262 (Mont. 1983) (Shea, J.,
dissenting).
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holding in light of this new piece of information. The Krivda type remand becomes a test of wills, so to speak, in which state judges must
demonstrate their "commitment" to their original ruling. A state court
will register its relative commitment by reinstating its decision under
state law, reinstating the decision under federal law alone, or reversing
its original holding.
Understanding the Burger Court's vacate and remand policy in
terms of a test of wills helps explain the curious correlation between the
incidence of Krivda remand orders and a state court's willingness to
expand rights under the state constitution: the more active a state court
is in interpreting state civil liberties guarantees, the more likely it will
have its decisions vacated. Hence, the California judiciary, whose
Supreme Court has been variously described as "the preeminent state
forum in the bills of rights arena, ' "the birthplace of. . . new judicial federalism,"'' 4 7 whose supreme court is said to "lead all states in
placing decisions involving individual rights on state constitutional
grounds,"' 4 1 has also been the state system that accounts for over onethird of all vacate and remand orders. California is not alone. Twothirds of the state judgments vacated originated in state courts noted
for expanding rights under a state charter. Quite clearly, these are state
courts that understand the significance of relying on their own constitution-an understanding which makes implausible the Court's stated
concern that state judges may have invoked their own constitution because they felt compelled to do so by federal precedent.
The Krivda remand has become an instrument, not for resolving
ambiguous state judgments, but for expressing the Justices' policy orientations toward the judgments themselves. Every time the Court
overturns a state judgment, the message communicated to state judges
is that so far as the Bill of Rights is concerned, the constitutional interest at stake does not warrant as much protection as the state court had
chosen to give it. Such communication is bound to thwart the process
of independent state constitutional decisionmaking as well. Denying
state judges the support of the Bill of Rights may lead them to question
the legitimacy of extending additional protections under either the fed149
eral or state charters.
146. Project Report, supra note 66, at 326.
147. Note, Rediscovering the CaiforniaDeclarationofRights, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 482, 483
(1974).
148. Note, People v. Pettingill: The Independent State GroundDebate in Caiffornia, 67
CALIF. L. REv. 768, 770 (1979) (footnote omitted).
149. This is apparently what occurred on remand in State v. Jackson. Writing in dissent,
Justice Shea charged: "In the guise of compliance with the mandate of the United States
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One can observe the "chilling effect" of the Court's Krivda remands in those cases in which the state court reinstated its judgment
entirely on federal law and the original decision appeared to have been
based in part on state law. In State ex rel Terry v. Schubert, 5 ' the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the procedures for review established under the state Sex Crimes Act violated the due process rights of
those committed for sexual offenses. Throughout the opinion the state
court interlaced state statutory and constitutional sources with federal
precedents.' 1 The Supreme Court vacated the judgment. 5 2 On remand the state justices reinstated their judgment, but this time
grounded their decision entirely on federal law.' 53 Two justices, however, wrote a separate opinion reminding their colleagues that "it is the
prerogative of the State of Wisconsin to afford greater protection to the
liberties of persons within its boundaries under the Wisconsin Constitution than is mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment."' 154 They
urged the court to "rest [its] decision on the state statutes and the state
constitution, as well as the federal constitution."' 155 The case then came
back before the Supreme Court and again the decision was vacated,
56
only this time it was remanded "for further consideration in light of"1
two Supreme
Court decisions involving the du ercsrihsopr.process rights of pris157
oners.
The state court finally relented and modified its decision to
58
conform to federal precedents.1
Terry is an example of a state court in the midst of deciding
whether to afford greater protection under the state constitution. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court's initial decision freely borrowed from both
state and federal sources. It was only when ordered to explain itself
more clearly that the court backed away from invoking the state constitution. Had the United States Supreme Court not intervened in this
case, and had the state court been given an opportunity to experiment
Supreme Court's order of remand vacating our judgment, the majority has simply rewritten
Jackson to comport with its own views as to interpreting our state constitution. In doing so,
the majority has delegated to the United States Supreme Court our duty to interpret our
constitution. This constitutes an abdication of our duty to interpret our own constitution."
State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255, 262 (Mont. 1983) (Shea, J., dissenting).
150. 74 Wis. 2d 487, 247 N.W.2d 109 (1976).

151. Id. at 488-93, 247 N.W.2d at 109-12.
152. Percy v. Terry, 434 U.S. 808 (1977).
153. State ex rel. Terry v. Percy, 84 Wis. 2d 693, 267 N.W.2d 380 (1978).
154. Id. at 698-99, 267 N.W.2d at 383.
155. Id.
156. 443 U.S. 902 (1979).
157. The two cases were Parham v. J. L. and J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) and Greenholtz v.
Inmates of Nebraska Penal Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
158. State ex rel. Terry v. Percy, 95 Wis. 2d 476, 290 N.W.2d 713 (1980).
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with its innovation, it might have eventually decided to engraft the decision on to the state charter as well. Forced to choose before the experiment had a chance to proceed, the state court bowed to federal
authority.
As Terry illustrates, once federal law is perceived to be contrary to
a state court's interpretation of state law, various pressures operate to
induce abandonment of the independent state ground. One of these
pressures is the political opposition state judges encounter when extending civil liberties beyond minimum federal requirements. Concern
over political reprisal for expansive state civil liberties rulings is especially evident in the area of the rights of criminal suspects. Any state
court that expands criminal procedure guarantees does so at its own
peril.' 59 Thus, innovative state courts are caught between Scylla and
Charybdis: either they must toe the federal line or risk political retaliation at home.
Consider the California Supreme Court's curious behavior in People v. Braeseke. 6 ° In the original Braeseke decision, the state high
court reversed the defendant's conviction because it found his confession to have been illegally elicited under the state constitution. There
can be no doubt as to the independent basis of the court's opinion.
With the sole exception of Miranda v. Arizona 161-which itself is a requirement of the state constitution' 6 2 -there is not a single reference to
a federal decision. But there are numerous references to independent
state decisions. For example, after declaring that "the continued interrogation of defendant was in violation of Miranda and that the confession resulting therefrom is inadmissible,"' 163 the court cited four of its
own opinions excluding confessions under the state self-incrimination
guarantee. 164
159. All but one case, Department of Motor Vehicles v. Rios, 410 U.S. 425 (1972), involved the rights of persons accused of crime; four of the cases involved search and seizure
or confessions claims-two areas where state courts have been under political attack for
"coddling criminals." See supra notes 14-19.
160. 25 Cal. 3d 691, 602 P.2d 384, 159 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1979), vacatedand remanded, 446
U.S. 932 (1980), af'd on other grounds, 28 Cal. 3d 86, 618 P.2d 149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603
(1980).
161. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
162. See, e.g., People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231, 578 P.2d 108, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861
(1978); People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
163. 25 Cal. 3d at 703, 602 P.2d at 391, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
164. The cases were People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231, 578 P.2d 108, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861
(1979); People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976); People v.
Randall, ICal. 3d 948,464 P.2d 114, 83 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1970); and People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal.
2d 714, 441 P.2d 625, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1968).
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Despite these unequivocal references to state law, the Supreme
Court concluded that the decision was ambiguously grounded and remanded it to the state supreme court. Rather than immediately reinstating the decision under state law, the court ordered supplemental
briefs and, on reconsideration, decided to rest the decision entirely on
federal law.'65 One can only speculate about the justices' motives for
this change of position, but it may not be too wide of the mark to suggest that fear of being subjected to further public criticism may have
been a primary factor. Casting a controversial ruling in terms of federal requirements does not force state judges to shoulder the full responsibility for the decision. State judges, after all, are not the final
arbiters of federal law. But they are the final arbiters over state law
and so must bear complete responsibility for what they decide under
the state constitution. Assuming that responsibility-given the current
political climate 166 -was something the California Supreme Court was
not prepared to do in Braeseke.
Forcing state courts to choose between submitting to federal authority or facing political attack at home can hardly be said to further
state court autonomy. Nor can it be said that independence is advanced when Krivda remand orders serve to dissuade state appellate
courts from following the independent decisions of their own supreme
court and to adopt instead the Burger Court's more relaxed standards.
Yet this is exactly what happened in Braeseke as well as in a second
case originating in California, People v. Level.,67 Like Braeseke, the
Level case involved the question of custodial interrogation and, again,
the state court reversed the conviction, citing the same independent
state supreme court precedents.' 68 The only significant difference was
that the court of appeal clearly did not endorse this extension of state
law. Writing for the court, Judge Lillie spoke of being "compelled
under Miranda and the holdings of its California progeny"'' 69 to find
the confession inadmissible-to which she added, "we do so reluctantly.' 170 A lengthy dissent was filed by Judge Hanson in which he
criticized the majority's opinion as "a classic example of how Miranda
has been a contributing factor to the bankruptcy of California's crimi' 17 1
nal justice system."
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

People v. Braeseke, 28 Cal. 3d 86, 618 P.2d 149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1980).
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
103 Cal. App. 3d 899, 162 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1980).
See id. at 905, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 919 n.8, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 698, n.8.
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On remand, the court of appeal reversed its original holding, with
Judge Hanson writing the opinion for the court. Hanson justified the
court's about face on the ground that the Krivda remand order offered
an appropriate occasion for reconsidering the merits of the earlier holding: "[]t is clear when our original opinion in the instant case was
'vacated' by the United States Supreme Court and the matter 'remanded' to us that upon such a 'remand' we are authorized to decide
the issue anew so that 'a new judgment may be entered.' "172 Judge
Hanson then turned to the California Supreme Court's behavior in
People v. Braeseke17 3 for additional support. In Braeseke, he wrote, the
state high court "acknowledged its authority to 'alter' an original opinion if it so desired after its original opinion is vacated and the matter
remanded by the United States Supreme Court. . .""I Judge Hanson reasoned that "this reviewing court is clothed with the same authority by reason of the procedural posture of the case at bench
".

"1175

Turning to the merits, Judge Hanson began by rejecting the court
of appeal's original determination that California law governed this
case: "Miranda'sCalifornia progeny. . . are all factually distinguishable or inapplicable."1 76 Nor was Hanson willing to extend California
law to cover the situation in Level:
We decline to employ the 'independent state grounds doctrine' as
urged by the State Public Defender since the California constitutional prohibitions against self-incrimination are essentially identical to those of the federal Constitution and such an extension of
Miranda safeguards would have a substantial adverse effect on
California law enforcement efforts by impeding legitimate police
investigative activity and be inimical to an efficient and economical system of criminal justice. 177
Having succeeded in wresting the case away from California precedent,
Judge Hanson then grounded his decision upholding the conviction entirely on federal law.
The state appeals court's reversal in Level is a sober reminder that
when the Supreme Court interferes with state court decisions expanding rights, it may undermine the development of independent
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

People v. Level, 117 Cal. App. 3d 462, 468, 172 Cal. Rptr. 904, 907 (1981).
28 Cal. 3d 86, 618 P.2d 149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1980).
117 Cal. App. 3d at 468, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
Id.
Id. at 478, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 914.
Id. at 491, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 922.
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state constitutional interpretation.' 8 In California, where state appeals
judges do not always share their supreme court's penchant for expanding rights,
the Supreme Court's Krivda type remands encourage
"evasion"' 79 of the independent requirements established by the state
supreme court.
III. Federalism and the Protection of Civil Liberties
The Burger Court's brand of federalism, it would appear, only rewards one kind of state experimentation: experiments conducted in the
service of narrowing rights. Although state civil liberties claimants
have been told that federalism requires that access to federal courts
must be significantly limited, federalism has proven to be almost no
barrier at all to the Supreme Court's review of state court judgments
protecting rights. To quote Justice Stevens again, the Court's one sided
conception of federalism "has created the unfortunate impression that
the Court is more interested in upholding the power of the State than in
vindicating individual rights."'8 °
This is not the same brand of federalism that Justice Black spoke
so eloquently about in Younger v. Harris.'8 ' Rejecting the extremes of
either "blind deference to 'States Rights'" or "centralization of control
over every important issue in our National Government and its
courts, '82 Black argued instead that federalism entails

a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that
the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left
free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways
.... [T]he concept [represents] a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious
though it may be to vindicate and protect federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere
with the legitimate activities of the States. 83
178. See R. Gerstein, Serving Two Masters: The California Courts of Appeal and Criminal Procedure (paper delivered to the 1982 American Political Science Ass'n.).
179. See Wilkes, The New Federalismin CriminalProcedure: State Court Evasion ofthe
Burger Court, 62 KY. L.J. 421 (1974).
180. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 100, 104-05 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See
supra text accompanying notes 44-48 for a brief discussion of the Mimms case.
181. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
182. Id. at 44.
183. Id.
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Nor is the Court's treatment of state civil liberties decisions consistent with Justice Brandeis' concept of federalism, which considers state
court experimentation to be "one of the happy incidents of the federal
system."' 84 Decentralization, Brandeis contended, fosters an indepenas
dence of thought and attitude that is crucial if states are to "serve
' 85
laborator[ies] and try novel social and economic experiments."'
According to the Black/Brandeis perspective, vigorous enforcement of civil liberties constitutes one of those "legitimate activit[ies] of
the States"' 86 that should be protected from federal interference. Both
Justices built their judicial careers around the idea that preservation of
our federalist structure and protection of civil liberties are compatible
goals. To them, the willingness of state courts to expand civil liberties
was one of the blessings of federalism and merited the Court's support
and encouragement-not its condemnation.
The Burger Court's bias against expansion of civil liberties is apparent in the highly formalistic way in which the Court has interpreted
the adequate state ground doctrine. Determining whether an expansive
state court judgment is insulated from review is, under the Court's approach, essentially an exercise in citation checking. The only question
is whether the state judgment is adequately supported by references to
state law or state decisions expressly resting on state law so as to establish its independence from federal precedents.
What is missing, however, is any sensitivity to the impact of
Supreme Court review on the process of independent state court interpretation. As applied in the context of review of expansive state court
decisions, the Court's conception of federalism lacks any appreciation
for the contributions of federalism based limitations to civil liberties
development. Lacking an understanding of how federalism furthers
rights,' 8 7 the Court's formalistic application of federalist principles has
led to results which, from a Black/Brandeis perspective, must be re184. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
185. Id.
186. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 44.
187. The following passage by Justice Stanley Mosk of the California Supreme Court
bespeaks this understanding: "Encouraging the fifty states to experiment, to retain their
historic individuality, to seek innovative responses to problems of protecting individual liberty, may ultimately produce more of the answers [than will reliance on the national government] in the century ahead. . . . Using the state constitution in this way is no mere scheme
to thwart federal review by the current Court, though that may be a salutary byproduct.
And though some fragmentation may occur. . . the expanded liberty of individual citizens
that this approach makes possible fully justifies any absence of seamless uniformity." Mosk,
In the Future Will State High Courts GuardOur IndiidualRights?, L.A. Times, Jan. 1, 1978,
at 5 (quotedin Scheiber, supra note 64, at 686).
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garded as bizarre. In effect, the Justices have applied the adequate
state ground doctrine to thwart the very innovative forces that the
Court is supposed to be encouraging. Consider, as one example,' 8 8 the
current anomaly in which state judgments that contain cursory and
largely unexplained citation to state law will be held immune from review whereas independently reasoned opinions that may lack this ritualistic citation will not.18 9 If the rationale behind federalism in the civil
liberties area is that decentralization fosters social experimentation,
then should not the Court be encouraging principled state court independence? The current approach seems only to reward result oriented
citation shuffling. 190
This section appraises the conception of federalism that underlies
the Burger Court's review of expansive state civil liberties decisions.
This appraisal takes the form of an examination of three cases-Delaware v. Prouse,'9 ' Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. ,192 and Ore188. But see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) and discussion of the Prousecase
infra at text accompanying notes 195-209.
189. Compare, e.g., People v. Krivda, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521
(1973), where the Justices denied review to a California Supreme Court decision in which
the state ground was merely asserted without any accompanying rationale, with Fare v.
Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979), in which the Court reversed an independently reasoned
decision of the same state high court which lacked explicit reference to a state constitutional
provision. At least one member of the California Supreme Court believed that Michael C.
was independently grounded. In a recent interview, Justice Stanley Mosk declared: "Well,
first of all, in Michael C., Justice Mathew Tobriner's opinion didn't rely on federal cases; he
relied on Burton and on Randall which were both California cases. And, indeed, Burton
plowed some new ground. It held that a minor who asked to see his father or parents was
entitled to exercise his Miranda rights by asking to see them. So, in Michael C.., only state
cases. I don't think you'll find a single federal case in the Michael C. opinion of Justice
Tobriner. [Interviewer: Your interpretation of Michael C. is at odds with the U.S. Supreme
Court which granted certiorari and reversed the state court decision. Was the high court
incorrect in taking review?] I don't think they should have taken it, but they did and they
reached a different conclusion. Michael C. was a state interpretation of Miranda; the California court started with Miranda, assumed Miranda was good law. We then adapted Miranda to our state procedure and it was held that pursuant to the cases of Burton and
Randall which were state cases, a majority of the court felt that Michael C. had exercised his
right to remain silent on Miranda when he asked in this instance to see his probation officer.
You'll recall I also wrote a separate opinion suggesting that wasn't going to be much help to
him because there's an adversary relationship between a probation officer who is an agent of
the state and the minor." Collins & Welsh, An Interview with Stanley Mosk, 2 W.L.J. 8
(1981). On remand from the United States Supreme Court, however, the California
Supreme Court refused to reverse the defendant's conviction under state law. See, In re
Michael C., 21 Cal. 3d 471, 579 P.2d 7, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1978). The Michael C. case is
discussed in Gerstein, supra note 178, at 5-11.
190. See Developments in the Law, supra note 8, at 1336-47.
191. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
192. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
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gon v. Kennedy." 3 Study of these cases is instructive because each
illuminates a different aspect of the conceptual distance that separates
the Court's approach from the Black/Brandeis perspective.
A.

Delaware v. Prouse: What Constitutes an Independent Decision?

Under the adequate state ground doctrine, a state court not only
must invoke a nonfederal basis for its decision, but the nonfederal
ground must be truly "independent" of any federal basis in order to be
insulated from review.194 Unfortunately, there is no value neutral test
for determining independence. One's view of what constitutes an independent state ground is often a reflection of whether one sees the
Court's role in terms of fostering or curbing state court independence.
The Black/Brandeis conception of federalism, for example, would
favor a broad realm to state experimentation because it respects the
integrity of independently reasoned state court opinions. The Burger
Court, by contrast, has adopted an unusually strict interpretation of
this requirement, as is illustrated by its handling of this issue in Delaware v. Prouse. 9 5
Prouse involved an appeal by state officials of a Delaware
Supreme Court decision declaring unconstitutional random automobile
stops to check drivers licenses and vehicle registration. Concluding
that the constitutional ban against unreasonable searches and seizures
requires that stops be justified by at least articulable and reasonable
suspicion, the state supreme court held that random searches violated
the Fourth Amendment as well as the search and seizure provision of
the state constitution. 96 On review, the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged that the state constitution had been invoked, but nonetheless ruled that the nonfederal ground was not sufficiently independ197
ent of federal law to insulate the decision from review.
Speaking for the Court, Justice White justified this conclusion by
quoting from the state court opinion in which it was said that the state
guarantee "is substantially similar to the Fourth Amendment and a violation of the latter is necessarily a violation of the former."' 9 8 This
passage, taken from a 1963 Delaware Supreme Court opinion, 199 was
interpreted by White to mean that the state search and seizure provi193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

456 U.S. 667 (1982).
See supra note 68.
440 U.S. 648 (1979).
State v. Prouse, 382 A.2d 1359, 1362 (Del. 1978).
440 U.S. at 653.
Id. at 652 n.4.
State v. Moore, 55 Del. 356, 187 A.2d 807 (1963).
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sion lacked any independent vitality. Once this hypothesis was indulged, it was but a small step to the conclusion that "this is one of
those cases where 'at the very least, the [state] court felt compelled by
what it understood to be federal constitutional considerations to construe. . . its own law in the manner it did.' "200
Observe that Justice White simply assumed that the Delaware
court's desire to keep state constitutional requirements abreast of its
view of federal constitutional principles meant that the state court was
acting out of a sense of compulsion because of what it believed to be
federal requirements. There is nothing in the state Prouse opinion,
however, to support this interpretation. Although federal precedents
and principles are invoked, it is apparent from the way in which federal
law is used that the state court's decision was independently arrived at
and not the product of compulsion. This is confirmed by the cases
cited by the court in the crucial paragraph announcing its decision.
Not a single United States Supreme Cofirt decision is invoked. Instead,
every element of its holding is accompanied by references to decisions
of other state courts. It is simply implausible to suppose that the Delaware Supreme Court felt compelled to rule the way it did by decisions
handed down by the New York Court of Appeals2 0 1 or the South Carolina Supreme Court.20 2
The Burger Court's misreading of Prouse points up a fundamental
flaw in its entire approach to the question of what constitutes an independent state ground. The error, simply, is that the Court's conception of federal/state court relations rules out the possibility that
meaningful interplay between state and federal constitutional principles can take place without loss of independence to state law. To the
extent that this view adopts and builds upon federal standards, state
law loses its own distinctive character. 3
200. 440 U.S. at 653.
201. People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 330 N.E.2d 39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1975).
202. State v. Williams, 237 S.C. 252, 116 S.E.2d 858 (1960).
203. Amending the Court's rigid federal law/state law dichotomy to include a third category-a hybrid of state and federal constitutional principles-preserves a broader realm for
state court experimentation. Hybrid constitutional law is still
independent constitutional
law, not necessarily because of its textual grounding in state law, but because of the independence of the reasoning process that produced it. Prouse was clearly independent in this
latter sense. Presently, the only options state courts have are to either explicitly incorporate
federal standards into the state constitution, as the California Supreme Court has done in
the confession context, see People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr.
310 (1976), and supra text accompanying notes 160-77, or use federal standards without any
citation of federal cases.
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The Supreme Court's insistence in Prouse that state courts refrain
from adopting federal reasoning as a basis for their independent judgments has the effect of discouraging innovation. By forcing state courts
to segregate their state and federal rulings, the Court "steers state
courts away from the most fruitful and legitimate route to the reasoned
elaboration of state constitutional law."2" Under Prouse, state judges
are presented with "the unpalatable choice of either truncating--or at
least carefully circumscribing-that reasoning that informs their elaborations of state law, or risking Supreme Court review."2 5 The experimental method, however, is not one in which each experiment is
conducted in isolation from all others. Rather, each builds upon the
others' successes and failures. The experimental method, in other
words, is a cumulative process in which each advance adds to the general storehouse of knowledge.
State courts, operating within the common law tradition, often
borrow ideas and approaches from other jurisdictions as part of the
development of their own law. This is how the common law traditionally has operated and continues to operate in many areas of state
law.20 6 No one has suggested that in these areas state law lacks independence because it is heavily influenced by the decisions of other state
courts.
Perhaps the best response to the kind of thinking that guided the
Burger Court's Prouse decision is found in Chief Justice Hughes' dissent in Minnesota v. NationalTea Co.207 In many ways, Prouse was an
exact replica of National Tea. In both, the state court had explicitly
invoked state law while relying on federal reasoning to justify its decision. The federal law invoked in both cases was itself undergoing substantial doctrinal alteration: in National Tea, the majority was in the
process of abandoning substantive due process; in Prouse, a fundamental rethinking of automobile search law was taking place. Further,
204. Developments in the Law, supra note 8, at 1342.
205. Id.
206. Consider, e.g., Baum & Cannon, State Supreme Courts as Activists: New Doctrines
in the Law of Torts, in STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
83 (M.C. Porter & G.A. Tarr eds. 1982): "Courts, for instance, often make radical changes
in policy by overruling their own precedents or by substantially modifying or abrogating
traditional doctrines that have all the force of precedent. Although this variety of activism
can be found in constitutional or other kinds of public law, it occurs much more frequently
in the development of the common law where virtually all policy is of judicial origin. Common law doctrines often have important political implications-they determine who gets
what, when, and how, to use Harold Lasswell's phrase-but they receive at best only sporadic legislative attention." Id.
207. 309 U.S. 551 (1940).
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Hughes' penetrating critique rings as true today as it did forty years
ago. "That the state court may be influenced by the reasoning of our
opinions makes no difference," Hughes objected.2 0 8 It is the decision to

reach an independent result, not the source of the reasoning of that
result, which is important. "It cannot be supposed," the Chief Justice
wrote, "that the Supreme Court of Minnesota is not fully conscious of
its independent authority to construe the constitution of the State,
whatever reasons it may adduce in so doing."2 0 9 So long as the state
judgment does not violate federal statutory or constitutional requirements, the Supreme Court has no business conducting an inquiry into
the sources of a state court's reasoning.
It should require little argumentation to defend the proposition
that having one's decisions treated as deliberate, reasoned actions
rather than as unintended blunders is part of the institutional autonomy that federalism guarantees to state courts. That autonomy is undermined when the Court assumes that state judgments affording
greater protection for civil liberties are the consequence of a misconception of federal law rather than an expression of an independent
judgment.
B. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.: The Importance of

Constitutional Context
Part and parcel with the Burger Court's failure to recognize the
independent existence of hybrid state/federal constitutional law has
been its inattention to the divergent constitutional contexts in which
state and federal courts operate. The Justices have simply assumed
that in applying federal constitutional standards, state courts must also
adhere to the implicit institutional restraints that the Constitution has
imposed upon federal courts in the review of Congressional or state
statutes. This assumption, however, is questionable and deserves more
serious judicial attention than it has thus far received. Why for example, could not a state court, by virtue of authority granted under state
law, render an advisory opinion on the meaning of federal law; or apply federal constitutional standards to what federal courts would consider "political questions"; or adhere to a more liberalized set of
standing limitations even though federal law was being applied?2"'
208. Id. at 559.
209. Id.
210. See Porter, State Supreme Courtsand the Legacy of the Warren Court 3, in STATE
SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, supra note 206, at 9, who
raises the same issue: "[S]tate supreme courts have considerably more leeway than their
federal counterparts. They are not constrained by considerations of federalism. The reach
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Recently, the Justices conducted their first exchange on the "concontext" question in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
stitutional
Co. 2 1I At issue was whether the Minnesota Supreme Court had exceeded federal standards in striking down a state statute which banned

the use of nonrecyclable plastic milk containers while permitting other
nonrefilable containers. In an exhaustive survey of factual data relating to the impact of plastic containers in terms of solid waste management, state recycling efforts, preserving natural resources and
promoting energy conservation, the state supreme court concluded that
"upon our independent review of documentary sources, we believe the

evidence conclusively demonstrates that the discrimination against
plastic nonrefillables is not rationally related to the Act's objectives. 212
Writing for a seven member majority, Justice Brennan quarrelled

neither with the state court's selection of the rationality standard nor
with the factual conclusions upon which the state court had rested its
judgment.21 3 Instead, Brennan attacked the intensity of the state

court's scrutiny of the facts supporting the validity of the statute, declaring that, in effect, the state judges had "substitute[d] their evalua-

tion of legislative facts for that of the legislature.

' 214

Reiterating the

215

the Justice wrote
Court's abandonment of substantive due process,
that the Equal Protection Clause does not require states "to convince
the courts of the correctness of their legislative judgments. 21 6 So long

as courts can perceive a basis on which the legislature "couldrationally
have decided that its ban on plastic nonreturnable milk jugs might foster greater use of environmentally desirable alternatives," 217 then the

legislative classification met the strictures of the Equal Protection
Clause.
of their decisions is limited, and they have not felt compelled, in the interests of prudence, to
avoid 'political questions' or to refrain from passing judgment on the necessity for, or wisdom of, economic regulation. Their decisions may be based on the common law, state or
federal statutes, and on state and federal constitutional grounds, either separately or in combination. They hear the kinds of cases that seldom reach federal courts; as pertains to workman's compensation and products liability, state courts have, one study noted, become
increasingly 'concerned with the individual and the downtrodden' and are becoming 'more
willing to consider rulings that promote social change."' Id. at 9 (footnote omitted).
211. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
212. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. State, 289 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn. 1980).
213. For a discussion of Justice Brennan's CloverLeaf Creamery Co. opinion, see Tribe,
Federal-StateRelations in the ConstitutionalDoctrine, in CHOPER, KAMISAR & TRIBE, THE
SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1980-1981, at 216-19 (1982).
214. 449 U.S. at 470.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 464.
217. Id. at 466 (emphasis in original).
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In a lone dissent, Justice Stevens charged that the majority had
intruded upon state court independence by imposing federal constitutional limitations on the relationship between state courts and state legislatures. "The keystone to the Court's equal protection analysis,"2" 8
Stevens observed, "is its contention that courts should defer to the legislature's judgment of the facts supporting the challenged statute." Accepting this as an accurate statement of the authority of federal courts,
Stevens queried: "[What is the source-if indeed there be one--of this
Court's power to make the majestic announcement that it is not the
function of a state court to substitute its evaluation of legislative facts
for that of a state legislature?"2 9
The only response Justice Brennan offered came in a footnote 22in0
which he dismissed Stevens' thesis as "novel" but "without merit.
Brennan acknowledged that state courts are free to impose more exacting requirements under the state constitution-something which he has
lauded on several occasions. 22 ' Nevertheless, he insisted that "when a
state court reviews state legislation challenged as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is not free to impose greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law than this Court has imposed. 22 2
Another way to state the Brennan thesis is that when state courts
apply federal standards, they must behave asfederal rather than state
courts. But is not the distribution of power between the branches of
state government a state, rather than a federal, issue? For the Court to
claim otherwise is to sanction federal judicial tampering with the organization of state governmental authority. As Stevens protested in
dissent:
I should have thought the allocation of functions within the
structure of a state government would be a matter for the State to
determine. Nor is there anything in the Federal Constitution that
prevents a state court from reviewing factual determinations
made by a state legislature or any other state agency. If a state
statute expressly authorized a state tribunal to sit as a Council of
Revision with full power to modify or to amend the work product
of its legislature, that statute would not violate any federal rule of
which I am aware. The functions that a state shall perform
218. Id. at 477 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

219. Id. at 479 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
220. Id. at 461 n.6.
221. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of IndividualRights, 90 HARv.
L. REv. 489 (1977); Brennan, The Bill of Rights andthe States, in THE GREAT RIGHTS 65 (E.
Cabn ed. 1963).
222. 449 U.S. at 461 n.6. Justice Brennan cited Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), as
support for this proposition. For a critique of the Hass case, see supra text accompanying
notes 51-60.
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within the structure of state government are unquestionably matters of state law.2 23
The divergent constitutional contexts in which state and federal courts
operate must have an impact on the ultimate decision reached by state
courts. Simply because a federal court in similar circumstances would
be institutionally constrained from reaching the same result is not, by
itself, an adequate reason for upsetting the state judgment.
Additional support for Justice Stevens' position can be found in
Professor Lawrence Sager's insightful analysis of Supreme Court/state
court relations. 224 According to Sager, Supreme Court decisions will
often underenforce constitutional norms out of respect for the institutional limits that define federal judicial authority. Where such institutional concerns have led the Court to truncate the reach of its
constitutional holding, Sager suggests that "federal judicial doctrine regarding these norms . . . mark only the boundaries of the federal
courts' role of enforcement, '225 leaving a broader realm within which
state courts may operate.
As an example of his "underenforcement thesis, ' 226 Sager cites
City ofPittsburgv. Alto ParkingCorp.227 in which the Court reversed a
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision striking down a state gross receipts tax on the ground that it constituted a taking of property without
just compensation. Noting that the Court's more limited view of the
Takings Clause was largely the product of institutional concerns peculiar to the federal judiciary, Sager argues that the contrary state decision should have been immune from federal judicial scrutiny:
If an underenforced constitutional norm is valid to its conceptual
boundaries, the decision of the state court can be understood as
the enforcement of the unenforced margin of a constitutional
norm, that is, as the assumption of an important constitutional
role which the federal courts perceive themselves constrained to
avoid because of institutional concerns. On this basis, state court
extend the application of such norms
decisions which voluntarily
22 8
should be left intact.
Professor Sager is not the first to point out the institutional component of the Supreme Court's constitutional decisionmaking. Throughout the 1960's, Justice John M. Harlan, the Warren Court's steadfast
223. 449 U.S. at 479-80.
224. Sager, supra note 28.
225. Id. at 1221.
226. Id. at 1213.
227. 417 U.S. 369 (1974). Professor Sager's discussion of Alco Parkingcan be found in
Sager, supra note 28, at 1245-50.
228. Sager, supra note 28, at 1248.
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critic of the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, 229 argued that the extension of federal civil liberties standards would ultimately affect the
strictness with which the Court interpreted those standards. Justice
Harlan developed this insight in his separate opinion in Ker v. California.23 ° In Ker, decided two years after Mapp v. Ohio2 3 I applied the
exclusionary rule to the states, the Court held that state law enforcement agents would be governed by the same substantive standards governing searches and seizures as federal agents. In contemporary
parlance, Ker incorporated the Fourth Amendment to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.23 2
One of the reasons Harlan gave for opposing incorporation was his
fear that it would lead the Court to dilute the Bill of Rights in order to
accommodate its requirements to the diverse needs of the states. Declared Harlan:
The rule [of incorporation] is unwise because the States, with
their differing law enforcement problems, should not be put in a
constitutional strait jacket. . . . And if the Court is prepared to
relax [federal] standards in order to avoid unduly fettering the
States, this would be in derogation of law enforcement standards
in the federal system-unless the Fourth Amendment is to mean
one thing for the States and something else for the Federal
Government.23 3
Justice Harlan returned to this theme many times throughout his career,2 34 in effect warning his liberal colleagues that incorporation would
ultimately lead to some very illiberal results.
Williams v. Florida235 was, for Harlan, confirmation of incorporation's impact on the Court's interpretation of the Bill of Rights. In Williams, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a jury
trial did not include the right to be tried by a common law twelve member jury. This decision was startling because it upset an understanding
of the jury trial guarantee that had held sway on the Court for over
seventy years-an understanding that until Williams was deemed so
self-evident that it was not even considered open to challenge. Why
would a Court dominated by "liberals" abandon such a longstanding
229. For an excellent discussion of Harlan's criticism of incorporation, see Wilkinson,
supra note 11.
230. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).

231. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
232. See R. CORTNER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS 177-204

(1981).
233.
234.
78, 131
235.

374 U.S. at 44-46 (1963).
See cases cited in Justice Harlan's separate opinion in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
n.14 (1970).
399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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precedent in order to reach an arguably "conservative" result? Harlan
believed he had the answer:
The historical argument by which the Court undertakes to justify
its view that the Sixth Amendment does not require 12-member
juries is, in my opinion, much too thin to mask the true thrust of
this decision. The decision evinces, I think, a recognition that the
"incorporationist" view of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which underlay Duncan [v. Louisiana] . . .
must be tempered to allow the States more elbow room in ordering their own criminal systems. With that much I agree. But to
accomplish this by diluting constitutional protections within the
federal system itself is something to which I cannot possibly
subscribe.2 36
Harlan's analysis is persuasive. It is difficult to believe the Court
would have been prompted to abandon the twelve member jury requirement had the Sixth Amendment not been applied to the states in
Duncan v. Louisiana.237 Having done so, however, the Court was faced
with the problem of reconciling incorporation with the fact that many
states had for years utilized juries with fewer than twelve persons. Because the Court was unwilling to assert that the twelve person jury requirement was "not a necessary ingredient of 'trial by jury,'"238 there
was no alternative short of abandoning incorporation that would permit state diversity, except the excising of the twelve person requirement
from the Sixth Amendment. As Harlan correctly observed, this did indeed constitute a "diluting [of] constitutional protections within the
'239
federal system.
Another way of phrasing Harlan's insight is to say that the victory
of incorporation did not signal the demise of federalism. Federalism
survived but manifested itself in a different way. Prior to incorporation, federalism was recognized through the dual standards by which
state and federal actions were judged: the federal government by the
more exacting standards of the Bill of Rights, and the states by the
more permissive standard of "fundamental fairness" under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 40 Once the Court decided to hold the states and
national government to the same standards, however, a foreseeable
consequence was that the need for state diversity would be accommo236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 118.
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 87 (1970).
Id. at 118 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
For a discussion of the "double standard" under which the Court operated, see
ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 8-28 (2d ed. 1972); R. CORTNER, supra note 232, at
152-77.
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dated by weakening federal civil liberties requirements. In effect, the
Court ended up doing precisely what those who favored incorporation
accused Harlan of advocating, namely, "appl[ying] to the States only a
'watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the
Bill of Rights.' "24 The real irony is that the logic of incorporation
demanded that the same "watered-down version" be applied to the federal government as well.
Recognition that the Court's interpretation of the Bill of Rights
contains a built in "discount factor" necessitated by the demands of
federalism argues strongly in favor of permitting state courts to adopt
reasonable extensions of federal guarantees.242 There is simply no adequate justification for holding state courts to the same set of federalism
based limitations that apply to federal judicial review. As Justice Stevens' Clover Leaf Creamery dissent explains, much of the disagreement
between state courts and the Supreme Court over the outer limits of
federal civil liberties guarantees can be accounted for by the divergent
constitutional contexts in which state and federal courts operate. Even
when disagreement cannot be explained solely in terms of institutional
disparities, Justice Harlan's analysis suggests that the Court itself might
have adopted the state court's more expansive view were it not saddled
with the responsibility of fashioning nationwide standards. State
courts, whose decisions by definition do not extend beyond their own
borders, have the freedom to engage in civil liberties experimentation
without fear of causing disruption in other jurisdictions.
C.

Oregon v. Kennedy: Understanding the Dynamics of Independent
Interpretation

For a tribunal which has so often praised the theoretical virtues of
decentralization and state autonomy,2 43 the Burger Court has remained
remarkably insensitive to the actual impact of federal judicial review
on the dynamics of independent interpretation. State experimentation,
241. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964).
242. See Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Awayfrom a ReactionaryApproach, 9

HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1981): "In interpreting their own charters, state courts need not
only apply differently those federal standards incorporated into their constitutions, but more
importantly, may announce their own original standards. Thus, state courts whose constitutions so permit have the opportunity to consider anew a jurisprudence of freedom of speech,
or they may want to think through the wisdom of employing the 'rationality' analysis presently in vogue in the federal courts. In the criminal procedure context, state judges, by
relying on their state constitutions, could reformulate the law of confessions or rearticulate
the constitutional premises underlying the exclusionary rule. The possibilities are almost
endless." Id. at 7-8 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
243. See supra cases cited in notes 1-5.
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to be meaningful, must be more than a collection of cursory citations to
some provision of the state constitution. What is needed is the development of an independently reasoned body of principles. Inevitably, it
will be a slow, halting, and difficult process.
Much of the difficulty stems from the fact that in the post-incorporation era, independent interpretation is not an autonomous process.
The federalization of civil liberties law has diminished substantially the
opportunity for truly autonomous state court decisionmaking. Predictably, this has inhibited the development of state court independence.
Unless the Court is willing to permit state courts the necessary "elbow
room" to develop independent approaches to civil liberties problems,
little innovation can occur. The dynamics of independent interpretation, in other words, require that state judges look somewhere other
than Washington, D.C. to learn their constitutional law. 2" Yet by continually reviewing expansive state court judgments, the Court directs
attention away from independent sources and to its own
pronouncements.
The anti-experimental impact of Burger Court review is most apparent in states which have attempted to develop an independent jurisprudence. In California, for example, Robert Gerstein studied state
court of appeal responses to divergent state and federal supreme court
criminal procedure decisions and concluded that
where [the United States Supreme Court and state supreme]
courts. . . take fundamentally different views of what the shape
and weight of the relevant rights are, the Federal Supreme Court
may penetrate the state judicial hierarchy and successfully challenge the claim of the state Supreme Court to be the ultimate
articulator of legal doctrine for the lower courts.24 5
No state has exceeded Oregon in trying to develop an autonomous
body of civil liberties law.246 Under the leadership of Justice, and former law professor, Hans Linde, the Oregon Supreme Court has stood
244. See Linde, supra note 8, at 395: "In modem times. . . [i]t became the assumption,
not without cause, that the states would have to learn constitutional law from Washington,
D.C. Yet there have been occasions when the older view would have stood us in good
stead. . . . [Wihat reason is there for confidence that the national version of the first
amendment, or the fourth, or the fifth, will always be the best the nation could want?"
245. R. Gerstein, supra note 178, at I.
246. According to the Oregon Supreme Court, all state law issues, including those arising
under the Oregon Constitution, must be disposed of prior to any consideration of federal
law. See Cole v. State ex rel. Oregon Dep't of Revenue, 294 Or. 188, 190-91, 655 P.2d 171
(1982); Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 614, 624 P.2d 123 (1981). Only where the state court
decides all state law questions adversely to the claimant must the court address the federal
claims. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 291 Or. 231, 630 P.2d 810, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084
(1981); Haynes v. Burks, 290 Or. 75, 619 P.2d 632 (1980).
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the traditional preference for federal law on its head. In Sterling v.
Cupp, 247 the state high court announced the general rule that whenever
state and federal claims are presented in a case,
[t]he proper sequence is to analyze the state's law, including its
constitutional law, before reaching a federal constitutional claim.
This is required, not for the sake either of parochialism or of
style, but because the state does not deny any right claimed under
the federal Constitution when the claim before the court in fact is
fully met by state law.24 8
State courts may insist upon this ordering of claims because, as Justice
Linde has argued elsewhere, "[w]hen the state court holds that a given
state law, regulation, ordinance, or official action is invalid and must be
set aside under the state constitution, then the state is not violating the
fourteenth amendment." 24 9 Once the state court has granted the desired relief under state law, in other words, there may be no outstanding federal claim left to be resolved.
Requiring state courts to dispose of all state claims first is the most
effective method available for encouraging the independent development of state law.25 0 The more opportunities presented to state judges
for thinking about constitutional issues outside the context of strict application of federal standards, the more likely the development of a
truly fresh and independent jurisprudence of civil liberties. It is relatively easy for a state supreme court to announce the rule that state
claims be addressed first. Implementing such a policy, however, has
25
proved to be a much more difficult enterprise, as Oregon v. Kennedy 1
illustrates.
The Kennedy case involved the question whether double jeopardy
principles barred the retrial of a defendant whose first prosecution resulted in a mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct. The pre-Kennedy
federal approach, although far from clear on this issue, tended to emphasize the element of intent, requiring that the prosecutor's misconduct be part of some plan "to goad the [defendant] into requesting a
mistrial."2 5 The Oregon Supreme Court, by contrast, had interpreted
the state double jeopardy provision more broadly. In State v. Rath247. 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981).
248. Id. at 614, 625 P.2d at 126.
249. Linde, Without "Due Process"-UnconstitutionalLaw in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REv.

125, 133 (1970).
250. Cf. Suess Builders Co. v. City of Beaverton, 294 Or. 254, 263-68, 656 P.2d 306, 31215 (1982) (discussing relationship between state law and claims of denial of federal rights
brought under 45 U.S.C. § 1983).
251. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
252. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976).
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bun, 253 the court ruled that a bailiffs improper remarks to a sequestered jury constituted misconduct prohibited by the state constitution
even though the behavior was not "'triggered by prosecutorial or judicial desire to harass the defendant or afford the prosecution a more
favorable opportunity to convict.' "254 Moreover, the Rathbun court
reached this conclusion in full awareness that its holding was not compelled by federal law. Indeed, the court emphasized that "there is little
to be gained by our attempting to guess what the United States
255
Supreme Court might do . . .if this case were before the Court,
and therefore "we shall dispose of this case under Oregon law
,,256

Counsel for Kennedy raised both state and federal claims before
the state court of appeals. Contrary to the mandate of Sterling v. Cupp,
the court of appeals did not explicitly take up the state issue first. Instead, without citation to either the federal or state constitutional text,
the court spoke in terms of a general "theory of prior jeopardy" that
prohibited defendant's retrial.25 7 The Oregon Supreme Court denied
the state's appeal, at which point a writ of certiorari was filed before the
United States Supreme Court.
The Burger Court granted review and, in an opinion by Justice
Rehnquist, reversed.2 58 Acknowledging that there was some question
about the basis for the state court's decision, Justice Rehnquist stated
that "before turning to the merits of the double jeopardy claim," the
Court must first take up "respondent's contention that the Court of Appeals' decision is based upon an adequate and independent state
ground. 25 9 It took the Justice only a single paragraph to "reject...
these contentions. 2 60
In Justice Rehnquist's view, the issue could be resolved through a
simple exercise in citation checking. On the basis of his examination of
the cases cited in the state opinion, the Justice concluded that "with one
exception, the cases. . . outlining the 'general rule' that guided its decision are decisions of this Court."'2 6 ' The single exception was the
253. 287 Or. 421, 600 P.2d 392 (1979).
254. Id. at 431, 600 P.2d 397 (quoting the state court of appeals opinion in State v. Rathbun, 37 Or. App. 259, 264, 586 P.2d 1136, 1138 (1978), rev'don othergrounds, 287 Or. 421,
600 P.2d 392 (1979)).
255. 287 Or. at 431, 600 P.2d at 397.
256. Id.
257. State v. Kennedy, 49 Or. App. 415, 417, 619 P.2d 948, 949 (1980).
258. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
259. Id. at 670-71.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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court of appeals' decision in State v. Rathbun262-- the decision that was
subsequently reviewed by the Oregon Supreme Court when it announced its broader reading of the state double jeopardy guarantee.
Reference to the court of appeals decision in Rathbun, however, was
found to be insufficient to shield the Kennedy judgment from review.
According to Justice Rehnquist, "the Court of Appeals' decision [in
Rathbun] . . . clearly rested on federal grounds,
a fact which was so
263
recognized by the Oregon Supreme Court.1

Justice Rehnquist failed to recognize that it really made no difference whether independent sources were expressly invoked. The absence of any express references to state law was hardly conclusive on
the propriety of the Court's exercising review. The crucial question
was whether the state judgment was supported by state law. Clearly,
Rathbun refutes any suggestion that federal law was the only basis for
the court of appeals judgment in Kennedy. As the Oregon ACLU brief
submitted in Kennedy correctly noted, 64 if the Oregon Supreme
Court's Rathbun decision supported the judgment in Kennedy, then any
United States Supreme Court pronouncement on the merits would
amount to rendering an advisory opinion. 265 On remand, "the defend262. 37 Or. App. 259, 586 P.2d 1136 (1978).
263. 456 U.S. at 671.
264. Amicus Curiae Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of the
State of Oregon at 4, Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
265. To say that the Kennedy decision was an advisory opinion does not mean that it was
without significance. Certainly in terms of its impact on double jeopardy law generally,
Kennedy will have widespread national ramifications. One can expect that state prosecutors
will invoke Kennedy in an attempt to persuade state courts to follow the Supreme Court's
less stringent approach. This, at any rate, seems to have been on the mind of the Oregon
Attorney General, Mr. David Frohnmayer, who argued the state's case before the Supreme
Court in Kennedy. Consider the import of the following exchange between Justice
O'Connor and Mr. Frohnmayer during oral arguments: "JUSTICE O'CONNOR: Mr.
Frobnmayer, even if we were to agree with you in your argument here today as far as the
federal rule is concerned, if the case were to go back to Oregon, would Oregon apply a more
stringent test, as has been suggested in one of the amicus briefs, so that under the Oregon
constitution and under Oregon law, for example, in the Rathbun case, is a stricter standard
applied? . . . MR. FROHNMAYER: [T]o address your question, Justice O'Connor, it is
not clear what the Rathbun case would dictate, because at the time the supreme court decided Rathbun, it noted that there was no state or federal constitutional authority precisely
on point on the double jeopardy question where a bailiff attempts improperly to influence a
jury, and there is still no such federal case, so we would have to know whether or not this
Court, for example, would extend double jeopardy protection to a defendant where a bailiff
engaged in improper conduct."
What was "not clear" about Rathbun was not whether the decision supported the state
court of appeals ruling in Kennedy, but whether the state court would adhere to the broader
view adopted in Rathbun in light of a contrary decision by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Having the Burger Court air its views on double jeopardy maN have served the Attorney General's interests but it hardly furthered the Oregon Supreme Court's legitimate objec-
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ant would be entitled to reassert his state constitutional claims in Oregon regardless of what this Court says about federal law."2'66 The fact
that existing state law supported the defendant's claim meant that reversal by the Supreme Court would have no bearing on the appropriateness of the state court judgment. Therefore, consistent with the
teaching of Herb v. Pitcairn,2 67 the Court should have declined review.
Only when federal law forms the necessary and not merely a sufficient
basis for the state court's holding is it permissible for the Court to exercise review.
The Burger Court's handling of Kennedy was not only inconsistent
with the ban on advisory opinions, it also interfered with the state appellate review process. The state's highest court had, in unmistakable
terms, established the general rule that state courts address state claims
first. Operative state law afforded the defendant the relief he sought.26
Thus, it was implausible to suggest that the decision was simply the
product of an erroneous interpretation of federal law. As Justice Stevens wrote, concurring in the result, "it is entirely possible that that
court's refusal to review the Court of Appeals' decision was predicated
on its view that the decision was sound as a matter of state law regardless of whether it is compelled by federal precedents."2'6 9 At the very
least, the Court should have asked for clarification before exercising
review.27 °
Not only was it likely that the state high court's denial of review
was based on its reading of state law, but in terms of insuring the integrity of the state's appellate process, it was essential that the Court treat
tive of developing independent standards under the state constitution. Indeed, the task of
ensuring compliance with the Rathbun standards will be more difficult to achieve since state
courts will be able to "evade" the independent requirements of their own highest court
through the expedient of rendering judgment solely on the basis of federal law-or worse
still, to interpret state law in the shadow of the United States Supreme Court's pronouncement in Kennedy.
This is not a matter of mere speculation. On remand, the Oregon Court of Appeals
reversed its original holding and affirmed the defendant's conviction solely on the basis of
federal law. State v. Kennedy, 61 Or. App. 469, 619 P.2d 717 (1983). The Oregon Supreme
Court affirmed the Court of Appeals judgment but did so exclusively on the basis of state
law. State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983).
266. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 264 at 3-4.
267. 324 U.S. 117 (1945). "[O]ur power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise
opinions. We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and ifthe same judgment
would be renderedby the state court after we correctedits view offederallaws, our view would
amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion." Id. at 126 (emphasis added).
268. But see State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983) (affirming defendant's
conviction under state law).
269. 456 U.S. at 681 n.l (Stevens, J., concurring).
270. Id.

874

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 10:819

the state decision as independently based. If state courts are to have
the necessary breathing room to develop an independent jurisprudence,
then once the state's highest court has declared its intention to develop
a separate body of civil liberties law, that tribunal's decision to deny
review should be interpreted by the United States Supreme Court as an
indication that the decision was consistent with the requirements of
state law. Any other assumption would undermine the state's system of
discretionary review by the state supreme court. This point is underscored by Justice Hans Linde in his opinion for the Oregon Supreme
Court in the second round of appeals in Kennedy:2 7 '
In effect, when this court might reach the same result under the
Oregon law that a lower court reaches by citing federal precedents, we would have to allow review at the instance of a losing
party objecting only to the federal holding, while the successful
party who might prefer a decision on state grounds has no reason
to petition us for review. Surely a practice that requires a winning party to seek review solely in order to shift a favorable judgment from federal to state grounds is wholly unreasonable, apart
from its logical flaws.27
There is no small irony in Justice Linde's observation that as a
result of the Supreme Court's certiorari policies, state civil liberties
claimants may now have to appeal favorable lower state court judgments to the state supreme court solely in order to have the decision
reaffirmed as being a matter of state law. Equally troublesome are the
new burdens that the Court's review policies impose on state supreme
courts: the only way to guarantee the integrity of its own review process is to make sure that every decision carries the appropriate citations
to state law. One wonders why Supreme Court Justices, who know
firsthand the judicial headaches created by an overcrowded docket,
would so needlessly make more work for an already overextended state
judiciary. The final irony is that these additional burdens are being
imposed on state judges in the name of federalism and respect for state
autonomy. With friends like these, state judges might reasonably begin
to wonder, who needs enemies?

Conclusion
For nearly one-half of a century, the United States Supreme Court
has exercised largely unquestioned leadership over the pace and direc271. State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983).
272. Id. at 263, 666 P.2d at 1319.
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tion of civil liberties development.273 Having become so accustomed to
thinking about Supreme Court review of state court decisions solely in

terms of preserving individual rights, little attention has been given to
the impact that federal judicial intervention can have in terms of narrowing rights. The Burger Court's treatment of expansive state civil
liberties judgments is a poignant reminder that federal intervention can
hinder the protection of rights. The Court's insensitive approach to the
demands of independent constitutional interpretation has resulted in
the exercise of federal judicial review in a manner that thwarts the very

innovative forces that the Black/Brandeis conception endeavors to
protect.
The relationship between the United States Supreme Court and
state courts is complex and dynamic. The conventional portrait of state

judges as personally unsympathetic toward and institutionally incapable of vindicating individual rights2 74 no longer depicts current realities.27 5 An increasing number of state judiciaries are in the process of

openly questioning whether "the national version of the first amendment, or the fourth, or the fifth, will always be the best the nation could
want."2 76 The existence of active state courts willing to expand rights is
a reminder that "federalism need not be a mean-spirited doctrine that
serves only to limit the scope of human liberty." 277 It also presents the

Court with a rare opportunity to demonstrate that decentralization can
serve to foster civil liberties protection-to make the Black/Brandeis

ideal a constitutional reality-if only the Justices would refrain from
staying the hand of state experimentation. 278

273. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See also
L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? 97-114 (1975); J. ELY, supra note 34.
274. See Neuborne, The Myth a/Parity,90 HARV: L. REv. 1105 (1977).
275. See Solimine & Walker, ConstitutionalLitigation in Federal and State Courts: An
EmpiricalAnalysisof JudicialParity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213 (1983).
276. Linde, supra note 8, at 395.
277. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
278. It is difficult to improve on the sober reminder with which Justice Brandeis closed
his dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932): "To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiThis Court has the
ment may be fraught with serious consequences of the Nation ....
power to prevent an experiment. We may strike down the statute which embodies it on the
ground that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. . . . But
in the exercise of this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices
into legal principles. If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be
bold." Id. at 311.

